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AN INQUIRY INTO THE
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MOYNIHAN JOHN J

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AN INQUIRY INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLD WAR
AS A SYSTEM OF CONFLICT

by

John Joseph Moynihan

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

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INTRODUCTION

By the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union had between them certain differences of interest and ideology that were too great to be ignored. The manner in which these differences were expressed and the actions taken to resolve them have, over the past twenty years, come to be known as the cold war. The relations between the two powers in the postwar world have taken a form that is, in certain ways, new to the history of the world; a form that is directly a product of the age in which it came to be.

This study will be concentrated upon form. It will be an inquiry into the form taken in the expression of the generally hostile relations between the two great powers. It will attempt to demonstrate the acceptance by each of a method of conflict that had characteristics distinctly different from those of previous methods of conflict; and it will attempt to determine these characteristics and to trace their development.

The form in which the quarrel between the United States and the Soviet Union has been expressed was developed and refined through their first decade of conflict. During this period of time the developing and refining process consisted

of the establishment of a series of precedents that were, through trial and error, tacitly accepted and reinforced or rejected by both sides. There have been times in the development of these precedents when the two powers came close to war with one another, but on every occasion so far it has been avoided.

This paper will be an examination of the sum total of precedents for cold war action with a view toward the development of accepted rules of conduct by which a great-power conflict has been expressed. It will evaluate any rules discovered to determine their strength or lack of strength. Finally, it will proceed from an examination of the Soviet-American action pattern to a view of cold war as a conceptual whole, the sum of rules and precedents, and attempt to judge its value for the conduct of conflicts other than the one that brought it into being.

This author knows of no other study of cold war as a method of conducting conflict separate and distinct from other methods of conducting conflict. The nearest thing to such a study would be The Cold War...And After, by Professor Charles O. Lerche, Jr., of The American University. Professor Lerche uses a method he calls strategic analysis and studies the strategic interaction of the two opponents in the Soviet-

American cold war. He looks upon the cold war as a distinct period in the relations between the two states, and he does not study it in the abstract nor attempt to draw from its events lessons for the conduct of future conflict. As his level of study is strategic, this will be tactical, for it is on the level of tactics, techniques, and weapons used that the cold war makes its claim to distinction and offers a pattern to be followed. While this study does describe some of the events already described in The Cold War...And After, they are done in quite different ways and toward different ends that this author hopes will complement the previous work.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The idea of cold war as a system of conflict comes from the notion of "war system" expressed by Walter Millis and James Real in The Abolition of War and also by Bert Cochran in his book The War System. In his book, Cochran never defines his term; but he implies it to mean the habit of resorting to war for the final solution of international problems; and he includes in it all the physical appurtenances, particularly the military establishments, built to support this habit. Millis and Real speak of a war system "as specific to an age or culture as are its economic and legal systems". They describe the war system as being:

compounded of many elements--the weapons available; the forms of military organization and command; the relation of the military function to the economic and political functions of the societies involved; the legal, customary, or ethical principles surrounding the military instrumentalities and largely governing their use. It is the total war system, usually beginning with the weapons available and rising through the political and ethical systems based upon them, that determines the place of war in society, that puts limitations upon its use in in the affairs of the group or states concerned, and that defines the role of war in the larger problem of intergroup relations.¹

¹Walter Millis and James Real, The Abolition of War, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 5-6.

Millis and Real consider the modern war system to be deeply imbedded in the notion of the sovereign national state. This has led to the concept of total war fought, of necessity, for motives that would appeal to the nationalistic spirit of the citizens of the state. This sytem of warfare has been becoming less and less able to resolve international issues as it has become more and more directed to the pursuit of abstract power; and with the advent of the balance of nuclear terror even a demonstration of the inability of total war to solve conflicts can be so costly as to be prohibitive to men of reason.

Millis and Real, in their book, look for a future in which the residual problems of the Second World War are resolved and in which a demilitarized international political system is in operation. They say that we will still

have clashes of economic power and interest--politics is, in large measure, the resolution of power problems-- but they can be resolved today, we feel reasonably confident, without the enormous suffering and quite needless waste of the early 1930's... Sooner or later it will become apparent that basic international power problems can be resolved without the suicidal destruction of a major war. As this fact becomes apparent, we shall be on the road to an international political system from which major war has been eliminated, because we shall be on the road to seeing that major war has become an anachronism...²

William V. Shannon has called world politics in recent

²Millis and Real, The Abolition of War, pp. 189-90.

years "an attempt to work out the ground rules for political conflict in the thermonuclear age. Since the nature of nuclear weapons makes it too dangerous to escalate conflicts into major wars, these conflicts have to be considered in a different light than heretofore."³ Both Millis and Real and Cochran look for an abandonment of the present war system; and Millis and Real see, as an alternative to nuclear war, a demilitarized world in which "the irresolvable power problems--most of them military power problems--need no longer enter into international politics."⁴ They admit, however, that the creation of such a world is still a part of the future.

There is another alternative to nuclear war other than the abolishment of a war system and the formation of a demilitarized world. This alternative is the replacement of the present war system--and even the word "present" may not describe nuclear warfare accurately any more--with one better suited to the age of the balance of terror. The alternative system cannot be, strictly speaking, a war system, for war is the institutionalization of violence between states; and violence between states that possess nuclear weapons poses dangers too great to be acceptable. Rather, the alternative

³From an unpublished paper, "Politics," for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, quoted in Millis and Real, The Abolition of War, p. 190.

⁴The Abolition of War, p. 197.

system should be a system of conflict, a channel for the articulation and expression, and possibly but not necessarily the resolution--since even war cannot any longer guarantee a resolution--of major disagreements between states. War is a system of conflict; but systems of conflict are not necessarily limited to war; and they can include any method of competition upon which the participants can agree and from which they can receive satisfaction.

As an alternative to nuclear warfare for the expression of international conflict in the present age, one can look to the "cold war" that has been carried on between the United States and Russia for the past twenty years. From its events prior to the end of 1956, it is possible to discern a pattern of conflict articulation which has provided for those nations participating in it many of the advantages and few of the disadvantages of modern warfare. Advantages which are not capable of being provided by the cold war, such as definite resolution of issues, are those which have no certainty of provision in nuclear warfare either. The cold war, as it existed in its maturity at the end of 1956, will in this paper be analysed as a conflict system with its own rules of conduct and patterns of behavior, its own provision for score-keeping, and its own method of bringing about gains and losses,

all of which had grown out of the events of the preceeding ten years and had been accepted by its participants.

The theory of games of strategy can provide a basis in logic for the development of the cold war as a system of conflict. Thomas C. Schelling, in his book The Strategy of Conflict, applies game theory to, among other things, international relations; and in this light the cold war can be looked upon as a two-player, nonzero-sum game in which both players stand to gain more by keeping the game alive or by ending it, without a decision, by mutual consent than they stand to gain by "winning".⁵ This is so for two reasons, the first important enough that it makes the second, while highly significant, unnecessary. The first reason is that winning the cold war could serve as intolerable provocation to one's opponent, thereby resulting in nuclear war from which both sides stand to lose, or in some other kind of action outside the limits of cold war that would be highly detrimental to both sides. An example of other kind of action would be, in the event of a winner in the Moscow-Peking cold war, the open and irrevocable split in, and the resultant practical expulsion of a key nation and its few remaining followers from, the world communist movement. This would bring about to the

⁵Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), Chapter 4: Toward A Theory of Interdependent Decision, pp. 83-118.

winner a weakening, versus his rivals in the non-communist world, that is greater than any weakening caused by the continuance of a Sino-Soviet cold war.

The second reason for not winning a cold war consists in the benefits conferred upon participants by its existence. These benefits are such things as the development and maintenance of a national consensus, a threat against which to maintain allies that a participant can then use for his own purposes, and the very real ability to express, to the satisfaction of one's citizens, conflicts with other states. The benefits of cold war resemble very much those conferred upon the national state in the past by war or the immediate threat of war, but they are gained at the expense of far less blood and wealth than are normally spent on war.

Schelling relates how experiments in the theory of games of strategy have demonstrated that it is possible for two or more players, whether or not in direct communication with one another, to arrive at a consensus when it is in their interest to do so.⁶ The events from the end of the Second World War until the end of 1956 give indications that, with a minimum of direct verbal communication but with a maximum of signalling through strategic and tactical moves, the United States and Russia were able to arrive at at least a limited

⁶Op. cit., pp. 53-8.

consensus upon what was and what was not acceptable in the new pattern of international conflict; and the events since 1956 have further enforced, but not significantly added to, the pattern of action included in this consensus.

CHAPTER II

SETTING THE STAGE

1. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since the rise of the modern nation-state and the development of allegiance by individuals to the intangibles of fatherland and a particular way of life, the objectives of warfare have been expanded and its destructive power has been greatly increased. This expansion was a direct outgrowth of the ideas and principles upon which nation states are based, and it has resulted in commitments by the citizens of the warring state to an extent much greater than had been true in the past. Ferdinand Foch, lecturing to the French War College in 1900, characterized the new warfare as follows:

Truly, a new era had begun, that of national wars, unchecked in speed and scope because they were to consecrate to the struggle all the resources of the nation; because they were to take as their goal not a dynastic interest, not the conquest or possession of a province, but the defense and propagation primarily of philosophical ideals, secondarily of principles of independence, of unity, of non-material advantages of various kinds; because they were to put at stake the interests and personal resources of every common soldier and consequently his sentiments and passions--that is to say, elements of force which up to then had gone unexploited.¹

¹Ferdinand Foch, Des Principes de la Guerre, quoted in Walter Millis and James Real, The Abolition of War (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), p. 19.

Yet the new warfare of the nation state has been unable to attain its expanded objectives and to resolve conflicts over intangible goals, particularly the abstract questions of power and national ideology.

The series of wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras was one of the earliest modern attempts to export an idea by force, and the results gained were used here primarily to increase the national power of the state personifying the idea being exported. The Congress of Vienna resulted in the formalization of a system in which the further projection of such intangibles would be considerably more difficult. For a long time this system was successful.

During the existence of the international system established at the Congress of Vienna, wars were fought by the countries participating in that system. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was fought by Germany using the new mobilization techniques of national warfare, yet it was limited both in objective and effect. Its comparatively few battles settled the immediate power issue between the French and German military systems out of which it had risen. It produced a decision within the limits of the European state system, and after it things went on much as they had before. The war had an objective that could be and was attained, the registration

of a shift of the power position of Germany and France within the international system. Other wars fought on the fringes of the system, such as the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese War, were also limited in their objectives and in their effects on the territorial integrity and way of life of the participants' homelands.

The area in which the Franco-Prussian War exceeded the limits of the balance of power system was a direct outgrowth of the development of the national state. The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was not a deliberate object of the war but was something added to increase the German sense of security in the face of a permanent Franco-German political enmity.² It also served as a symbol of Germany's new position in the European system that could be understood by all of her citizens, as well as by those of France.

During the near-century in which the system established at the Congress of Vienna was in effect, the European powers sought to project their power vis-a-vis one another by methods other than direct warfare. The French occupation of Algeria in the 1830's can be looked upon as a desire to re-establish French prestige and power on the European scene. The British

²Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Alford A. Knopf, 1951), p.45.

takeover in Egypt assured the protection of the Suez Canal, not only from the minor powers in the area, but also from Britain's European rivals. The Boer War of 1899 can be considered in the same light in regard to the Cape Colony.

There were, during this period, instances which demonstrated the inability of war to resolve satisfactorily questions of power and to change the ideas of people, or at least the extent to which war would have to go to do so. Both the South African War in 1899 and the capture of the Philippines by the United States were followed by long and exhaustive guerrilla wars against people who did not know they had been beaten. The quick, decisive wars of the international system were being replaced by something that took longer, cost more, and still was unable to resolve the question at hand.

The most significant example of the inability of war to satisfy intangible objectives was the American Civil War, the first of the modern total wars. The Civil War was fought by the Union in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the nation; it was fought by the Confederacy to defend a set of ideals and traditions and a way of life from impending domination by outside forces which, it was feared, would try to change them. By the time of General Lee's surrender it had become the bloodiest war in history; and its result was a

demonstration that while methods of war could gain physical control of territory, they were powerless when it came to altering ideas held by people. The Union was physically preserved; the spiritual damage to it is being repaired even today.

The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand could better be termed the trigger than the cause of the First World War. It has been extremely difficult for historians to determine specific causes of the war; it was widely believed almost until it started that such a war was impossible, just as it was feared that it was inevitable. "The War had no cause other than the system out of which it grew; the tragedy lay in the fact that there was nothing in the ideas, the concepts, and institutions of the day to make possible its prevention."³ The forty years since the Franco-Prussian War had seen the development by the other European states of military machines based upon the Prussian model. The search by each state for adequate security led to mutually increasing fear and suspicion; positions taken to gain the support of allies and the increasing rigidity of the defensive alliances removed from the international system the flexibility it needed to surmount this last of many crises.

³Millis and Real, The Abolition of War, p. 42.

The war, like so many other wars, was expected to be short, but the deadlock on the Marne proved it otherwise.

The Battle of the Marne was one of the decisive battles of the world not because it determined that Germany would ultimately lose or the Allies ultimately win the war, but because it determined that the war would go on...The nations were caught in a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit.⁴

By the end of 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson made his effort to bring about a peace without victory for either side, the war had degenerated into a struggle over power for power's sake. For two years evil had been personified for each side by the opponent, and all the troubles of the war had been blamed on him. By the end of 1916, the Allies were fighting the war to defeat their opponent, to exercise domination over him, and not for any concrete or objectively realizable gain.

The Allied victory presented problems for which the international system had no means of solution. The peace was imposed by the victors upon the vanquished, not negotiated between them; and its element of dictation without regard for the interest of the defeated power was more apparent than any previous peace treaty of modern times. Secondly, the Treaty of Versailles, unlike any previous treaty of peace, was based

⁴Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York; The MacMillan Company, 1962), p. 440.

upon a number of general principles enunciated during the war. When departure from these principles was frequently made in the specific articles of the treaty, a handy argument was provided for those who later wished to oppose it.⁵

After Germany had been disarmed, there was little more that military power could do. The French occupation of the Ruhr failed to extract by military means reparations that were not there to be extracted. The assigning to Germany of the guilt for the war, the political isolation to which she was subjected during the 1920's and early 1930's, and the impossible burden of reparations only served to delay Germany's return to her rightful place among the nations and to warp her outlook when she did return. The problems of the 1920's and 1930's could possibly have been handled by the victors and vanquished working together. Instead, the conditions in the defeated power were allowed to become such as to precipitate the rapid rise of Adolf Hitler.

The Second World War has often been referred to as a continuation of the first. It is relatively simple to isolate its cause--the desire of Adolf Hitler to use the means of war to seek revenge for the peace which the principal members of the international system had imposed upon his country.

⁵Edward H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1963), pp. 4-6.

Both England and France seemed to be morally and physically tired; and, until the invasion of Poland showed that there was no reasonable point of termination of the German expansion, were unwilling to use the military power that each had depended upon to keep Germany as a defeated state. To bring that kind of military power to bear would require, in both countries, a commitment similar to that of the First World War; and the governments and people of England and France were slow to believe that the war to end all wars had failed in its purpose so soon.

The Allied objective of unconditional surrender has to be looked upon as a desire for total domination over their enemies. The Atlantic Charter, which required an Allied victory to make it worth the paper on which it was written, was an attempt to impose terms of peace upon their third major ally through moral force. The Anglo-American blueprint for a future world was more humane than any world had turned out to be in the past, but it was still a set of war aims that Russia was expected to uphold but in whose formulation she had no part. The Charter itself was a collection of war objectives, general in both language and content. The originators of the Charter thought of it as something to be applied toward the rest of the world, with themselves as enforcers

not particularly bound by it.⁶ Their greatest mistake was an expectation that everyone else on their side was fighting for the same objectives, and that with the changed circumstances of victory all would still be in agreement.

Russian objectives in the Second World War were a little more clear. Her initial one was to remain out of the war as long as possible and to enter on the side of the winner when convenient. Her goal was to increase her power and the power of the communist system by extending their influence over as much of Eurasia as possible, particularly those areas which Russia had lost after the First World War and others which have historically been objectives of Russian foreign policy.⁷

The end of the Second World War completed a time period in which "a political system intended to be balanced by force became transformed into one in which force might destroy peoples and cultures but could not win politically relevant objectives."⁸

⁶Staughton Lynd, "How the Cold War Began" reprinted in Norman D. Graebner ed. The Cold War (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), p. 3.

⁷George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New York: New American Library, 1960), pp. 325-9.

⁸Charles O. Lerche, The Cold War...And After (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 5.

The only objective accomplished by the Second World War was that which came as a direct result of its events, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the bringing into being of the post-war international power structure. The war destroyed the German and Japanese aggressive expansionism, but this destruction left in its wake a set of new problems, new powers, and new weapons. The methods by which the new powers have attempted to articulate their problems with each other, in the face of the new weapons, have evolved over the space of almost twenty years into the system we know today as the cold war.

2. THE FORMALIZATION OF THE SYSTEM

"Cold war" is a term that was coined early in the post-war conflict. At the time it was used to describe Soviet-American relations, generally hostile in nature, the future of which was obscure. Over the years, Herbert Bayard Swope's clever phrase has become a household word, and its meaning has changed from a strict Soviet-American connotation to "a conflict characterized by the use of means short of sustained overt military action"⁹ and open to application to conflicts

⁹The term "cold war," which was popularized by Walter Lippman, was first used publicly by Bernard Baruch in a speech in April, 1947. According to a statement made to the press in

other than that between the United States and the Soviet Union. The cold war system as we know it today has its own vocabulary containing such words as bipolarity, balance of terror, nuclear blackmail, and crisis management. It has its own momentum, and to a considerable extent it has been developing its own rules and limits. Before inquiring further to determine this extent, however, there will be a pause to review the paths taken by the United States and Russia in their involvement in conflict with one another and their formalization of this conflict.

As soon as the defeat of Germany appeared certain, the cement of fear holding the Allies together began to crumble. At the same time, the postwar power positions of the Allies relative to one another began to come apparent. The wartime conferences produced "formulations, generalized pledges, and vague declarations of intentions"¹⁰ which were amenable to interpretation by each signatory to suit his own interests.

reference to the expression several years later, Mr. Baruch credited the expression to Herbert Bayard Swope, who had originated the term as early as 1946. James D. Atkinson, The Edge of War (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 230. The present definition of cold war is from Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G.&C. Merriam Co. 1963).

¹⁰Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The United States and Russia", reprinted in Breabner, The Cold War, p. 27.

The inadequate appreciation of each other's basic policy goals on the part of the Russians and the Americans produced distrust on one side and excessive optimism on the other. Russia sought to gain territory and extend her influence westward as a result of the war; the United States did not appreciate or seem to take very seriously this objective. The United States had no territorial objectives in the war; the Soviets could not understand this and considered it as an attempt to cheat them out of their spoils. The American estimate of Japanese ability to continue the war after the defeat of Germany made necessary Russian entry into the war against Japan, and American leaders overestimated also their own ability to get Russian cooperation for the purposes of the United States in the United Nations.

As the war with Germany neared its end, it was evident that Eastern Europe would be at the disposal of Russia regardless of any commitments that were signed earlier. The Allies were willing to bring only moral force to oppose Stalin, and the Russian leader was aware of the inability of moral force to make any effect at all. American public disillusionment toward the idea of Russian cooperation in the world system desired by the United States was slow in coming. Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" telegram had been sent to

President Truman four days after the German surrender, but any effect the Prime Minister's words had on the President's behavior was not noticeable.

American disillusionment continued to grow throughout 1946; but despite it demobilization continued, and there still remained some hope for Russian cooperation. The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris to formulate the secondary peace treaties was another exercise in frustration, and a United Nations commission meeting to establish means of international control of atomic energy failed when the two major powers could not reach agreement. The Russian policy of secretiveness throughout their zone of occupation continued. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed to assist Greece and Turkey; a communist government was established in Hungary; and later in the year Russia prevented any possible direction of Marshall aid to the countries of Eastern Europe. Through the last half of that year an awareness by the people of the United States of the realignment of the world political situation began to make itself evident in the gradually increasing support by the public for the European Recovery Program. The final blow came on February 25, 1948, when a coup in Czechoslovakia resulted in that country being quickly pulled behind the iron curtain. The ERP was promptly

passed by Congress; the acceptance of the cold war was complete.

It can be said that the cold war originated as a natural reaction to a wartime alliance once the uniting circumstances had been removed. It can also be said that the cold war came about simply because the United States and Russia found themselves alone as the two major powers in the world. From the circumstances in which the two powers found themselves at the end of the Second World War, an eventual quarrel between them was almost inevitable; that it would take the form it did was by no means certain at the time. The direction of the quarrel into its eventual form was partly due to the characteristics of the participants and partly due to a conscious effort on the part of each.

Both major powers, at the end of the war, were tightly oriented toward their conflicting ideologies. The Soviet Union and the United States each had a design for the future which it believed would contain the answer to all the major problems of the world. The Soviets voiced confidence in the inevitable success of their system, and they expressed their continued purpose of spreading the domination of their communist system throughout the world. The United States wanted the international system sponsored by herself spread throughout the world to promote the American values of freedom and

democracy. She considered her postwar role to be that of first among equals in the promotion and enforcement of this Western value system, and she could not accept the unwillingness of any other important nations to consent to this idea upon which she had staked such high hopes for the future. The conflicting ideologies exerted considerable influence on the outlook of each side toward the other and toward the world as a whole; the Russians' full of native suspicion and Marxist ideas of capitalist hostility, the Americans' more open, idealistic, and containing a large measure of innocence born of long isolation from European power politics. Cecil Crabb captured the effect of this added element of international disagreement when he wrote that the "injection of ideological conflict into international affairs on a scale seldom experienced in recent history has intensified existing sources of disagreement and made problems, which were already inordinately difficult, well-nigh insoluble".¹¹

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had, at the end of the war, a significant lack of knowledge of each other. Both were inexperienced in the great power role, and neither had maintained close involvement with the other or

¹¹Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Evanston: Row, Peterson, & Company, 1960), p. 194.

with Europe prior to the war. In each country the impression of the other was highly colored by wartime propaganda which in the United States oversold the Soviet Union as an enduring ally and in Russia belittled the role of the United States in the Great Patriotic War. The United States had considered Russian communism as evil until Russia suddenly became a war-time ally. Russian leaders considered the United States as a loose and lax country that was not to be taken too seriously in international affairs.¹² To make knowledge of one another even more difficult, each ideology had its own vocabulary which consisted of the same words but with considerably different meanings not known to the other, so that each power ran into obstacles even in the communication of its position to the other.

Significant also was the very recent completion of a highly destructive war, lessons of which had reinforced those of the First World War and which had been brought to an end by the development of a weapon that would make future wars even more destructive. Stalin, as well as the United States, was aware of the value of the atomic bomb as an instrument of warfare, and he did not want to become involved in a war

¹²David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Co., 1961), pp. 46-7.

with the United States until he had achieved parity in it.¹³ Even without the advent of the atomic bomb, Russia had absorbed, in the Second World War, losses sufficient to make any large scale war a dubious prospect. The immediate Russian objective was to lay hold of any territory that might be available, but not to stretch her national resources any farther on adventures that might arouse the ire of the world's only atomic power.

The end of the Second World War brought to the United States an immediate desire to return to overdue domestic affairs and to get the soldiers home. The physical security of the country was assured by her possession of the atomic bomb; the development of the United Nations would assure the security of the rest of the world. In the meantime, demobilization would take place as rapidly as possible. Those who saw Russian policy as a threat to the interests of the United States were unwilling to take the drastic steps necessary to establish an American consensus in support of containment of Russia. The task of winning one war had just been completed; and, with their traditional slowness to depart from preconceived notions, the people of the United States were unwilling

¹³Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp.20-2.

and psychologically unready to go on with another.¹⁴

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union did have an immediate objective in the territory occupied by each power at the end of the war. Russia had historically been an expansionist power wherever opportunity offered, and she considered the territory occupied by her armies at the time the shooting stopped as a suitable reward for her victorious struggle. It is possible that she would have settled for less and accepted a unified, disarmed, and neutral Germany that would signify a westward movement of the line of buffer states that had been established between East and West in Europe after the First World War.¹⁵ We never had a chance to find out, for the immediate American concentration was on the Polish rather than the German political situation after the war.

The American lack of desire for territory as a result of the war implied a strong enough position in the concert of controlling powers that her influence could be dominant wherever necessary throughout the world. This position was not

¹⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 33-40.

¹⁵W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 144.

based entirely upon military power, but also on the position of the United States as moral and economic leader and on the rightness of the American principles upon which the new world system was to be based. The position required the cooperation of the other powers, and the United States expected that it would be given. The position of the United States included on her part considerable tolerance for the interests of other nations, but it was still one in which she would be dominant.

A propaganda offensive against the capitalist world had been an integral part of Soviet policy since 1917, and it had been discontinued only temporarily during the Second World War. Even before the end of the war it had been returned to full operation, this time directed primarily against the United States. By the latter part of 1947, it had become sufficiently severe that it was the subject of diplomatic notes between American Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in which Ambassador Smith compared it to the work of the Nazi machine at its worst. What was considered by Ambassador Smith to be an "increasing flood of half-truths, distortions of truth and utter falsehoods" was defended by Molotov as the desire of the Soviet press to "elucidate broadly as possible the actual situation and true facts of life in other countries, attaching special

significance to the strengthening of friendly relations between peoples". Molotov then accused the American press of anti-Russian propaganda.¹⁶

In addition to the propaganda attacks and the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Russians, the United States was, during this time, becoming concerned about what was taking place in the areas of Soviet occupation. Tight Russian military and police control was maintained over Eastern Europe; and the Soviet treatment of opposition groups or individuals was, to say the least, not carried on in a manner to which the United States was accustomed. The dismantling of industry in occupied countries and the enforcement of changes in their economic and social and political systems aroused in the West a concern for the interest of the people of Eastern Europe as well as for the ways in which the interest of the West would be directly affected by the continuance of Russian expansion. When the expansion was pressed into Czechoslovakia, the United States could maintain its position of relative inactivity no longer; it was time for the

¹⁶Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1947, pp. 743-4.

formalization of the conflict.¹⁷

On the Russian side, the cold war was never formalized, but by 1948 it had been in operation for some time. W. W. Rostow dates its inception from the time the Politburo was sure Stalingrad would hold--roughly from the beginning of 1943. At this time Moscow returned to the territorial pre-occupations which were at the center of her diplomacy in the period 1939-1941, and the shift was manifest in the spirit and tactics of Soviet behavior in many areas during the year 1943.¹⁸

¹⁷A continuing characteristic of the cold war has been its lack of absolutes on both sides. The fall of Czechoslovakia is chosen as the instance of formalization because it coincided closely with the resumption of the military draft in the United States and because it was followed by American policy speeches which expressed explicitly to the people the idea of a conflict between the United States and Russia. Earlier American action to combat communism can be considered comparable to the actions taken immediately prior to the declaration of hostilities in the Second World War because they were either a result of specific instances, such as the cancellation of advance reparations to Russia from the Western zones of Germany, or were promulgated in policy speeches which did not so clearly identify the aggressor, such as the reference to "armed minorities or outside pressures" in the Truman Doctrine.

¹⁸W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p. 141. Another authority dates the time of the Russian beginning of the cold war as March 1946. Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe, p. 189.

The American formalization of the East-West conflict came about over a much longer period. Firm action in Iran in 1946, where American interests were directly threatened, had results;¹⁹ but this was an isolated instance. American policy toward Russian war reparations from the West zones of Germany hardened considerably during the immediate postwar years, and American aid to Greece and Turkey helped to end the threat of Russian expansion to the south in the spring of 1947. Secretary of State Marshall's speech in June 1947 and George Kennan's "Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs magazine the following month were strong indications of the changing policy, but it took some time before their effect was felt in the country as a whole. The completion of the change in policy toward a Europe threatened by the Soviet Union was officially promulgated by President Truman in his Address to the Congress on March 17, 1948. In this speech he said that "as long as Communism threatens the very existence of democracy, the United States must remain strong enough to support the countries of Europe which are threatened with Communist control and policestate rule", and that "the time has come when free men and women of the world must face

¹⁹Rostow, p. 184.

the threat to their liberty squarely and courageously".²⁰

Two days later, at the University of California, Secretary Marshall made the position even more clear when he called the conflict between the United States and Russia "a world-wide struggle between freedom and tyranny, between the self-rule of the many as opposed to the dictatorship of the ruthless few".²¹ The battle had been joined, and now it would be up to the United States and Russia to work out their rules of conflict.

²⁰Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1948, pp. 418-420.

²¹Ibid., pp. 422-5.

CHAPTER III

THE LESSONS OF BERLIN

While the existence of the cold war was slowly being recognized in the West, the Soviet Union was taking steps in Berlin that were to lead to the first instance of direct conflict with the United States. The blockade of Berlin and the subsequent airlift provided several important steps in the development of the pattern in which the East-West conflict was to be conducted, as well as a sign of the determination of the West to resist Soviet efforts to expand into Europe.

The City of Berlin provided a practically ideal situation in which the Soviets could apply pressure upon the West. The Western enclave located almost in the center of the Soviet zone of Germany placed the Allied occupation forces in a situation of extreme vulnerability. The Russians had good reason to apply all possible pressure, for the presence of the Western powers in Berlin had prevented the incorporation of the city into the economy of East Germany. Pressure upon the occupation forces of the Western Allies could, if successful, bring about either the elimination of the Western

enclave in Berlin or the inclusion of the Russians in a four-power agreement for the whole of Germany based along the lines of the Warsaw declaration of June 25, 1948.¹ From the viewpoint of the Soviet policy makers, the most fortunate thing about the alternatives available to the West was that acceptance of either could be expected to shortly bring about the acceptance of the other.²

The situation whereby the Russians were able to use Berlin as a lever against the West came about as a result of the early Western policy in Berlin in the days when the cold war was a one-sided affair not yet acknowledged by the West. The question of access to Berlin was never pressed very hard by Allied commanders. General Clay reported that, at a meeting on June 19, 1945, with Marshall Zhukov of the Soviet Union, he accepted an oral agreement providing for the use of one main highway, one rail line, and two air corridors between Berlin and the west zones of Germany. General Clay reserved the right to reopen the question later in the Allied Control Council, but at the time he did not fully realize the

¹This declaration is contained in USSR Information Bulletin, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1948, p. 398.

²W. Phillips Davidson, The Berlin Blockade, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 26. This detailed and well-documented study provided the raw material for much of this chapter.

difficulties that would be involved.³ Colonel Howley, chief of military government in the American sector of Berlin, called the Western policy toward the Russians one of "doing almost anything to win over the Russians, allay their suspicions, and convince them we were their friends."⁴ The final agreement on air corridors, signed early in 1946, was one in which the Western Allies had a considerable amount of bargaining power, and when it was signed it is quite possible that the Soviets considered it as more advantageous to them than to the West.⁵

The events in the blockade and airlift themselves were simple enough. The four-power government, from its inception in July 1945, had been the scene of decreasing cooperation between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, and the different policies pursued in each sector of occupation led to a gradual splitting of the city. This split was in progress, but by no means complete, when in the spring of 1948

³General Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1950), p. 26.

⁴Frank Howley, Berlin Command, (New York: Putman, 1950), p. 56.

⁵Davidson, op. cit., pp. 35-6.

the Soviets began to progressively tighten travel and transport restrictions between Berlin and the western zones of Germany. The increasing restrictions on ground transport were not seriously opposed by the West; but, following a mid-air collision between a Soviet fighter aircraft and a British transport in the air corridor to Berlin,⁶ the Allied powers became extremely sensitive to Russian violations of the air access agreement. A currency reform in West Germany took place on June 18, and the Western commanders in Berlin made overtures to the Soviet Military Governor with a view toward a new currency policy for the city. On June 22, the Russian commander announced an East German currency reform that was to include the entire city of Berlin. The next day the Western powers began to distribute West German currency in their sectors, and on June 24 a complete land blockade of West Berlin was announced by the Soviets. Two days later, on June 26, an airlift was instituted by the Western powers to bring into the city supplies needed by the people of Berlin.

1. NON-CONFRONTATION

The efforts of the four occupying powers to maintain or to increase their control in Berlin were conducted, as

⁶New York Times, April 6, 1948.

early as 1946, in a manner in which they would not become directly involved in disputes with one another. This generally involved, on the part of the Soviets, efforts to exert pressure through the people of Berlin and to obtain control of the city government to which the Western powers had come to grant a large measure of freedom and responsibility for the administration of the city. Pressure was applied by the Soviet occupation authorities and their local communist supporters upon each of the democratic political parties in Berlin, and this resulted eventually in splits between the pro-Communist and anti-Communist factions in each party.⁷

The Russian authorities also applied various pressures upon prominent individuals in the city government, the most flagrant case being the burgomaster crisis of April, 1947.⁸ Similar methods involving cajolery, threats, occasional mob action, and harassment of opposition were used to obtain control of or to force splits in the prominent nongovernmental institutions of Berlin; and the use of these methods was facilitated by the foresight the Russians had shown in moving the headquarters of the important city organizations to the east sector prior to the arrival of the Western occupation

⁷Howley, op. cit., pp. 104-8. ⁸Ibid., pp. 143-9.

forces.

During the time prior to the blockade the policy of the Western powers was one of accomodation and cooperation as much as possible with the Soviet authorities. In the cases of conflict between Soviet-supported elements and democratic forces in the city government, the Western powers officially remained uninvolved and maintained that these were purely affairs of the Germans. Privately, however, a number of American and British officials gave the democratic leaders what help and encouragement they could.⁹ During the months immediately preceding the blockade, the Allied policy was to sidestep rather than directly oppose Russian attempts to tighten control. In March 1948, the United States and Great Britain cancelled military train service to the west rather than comply with a Soviet directive; and for approximately ten days they operated a small airlift capable of carrying in 60 to 100 tons of supplies per day.¹⁰ The one area in which the Allied powers made no effort to avoid any confrontation in the pre-blockade period was in the case of the air

⁹Davidson, op. cit., pp. 58-9.

¹⁰Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion, (Frankfurt: Friedrich Ruhl, 1951), pp. 28-31. Lucius Clay, op. cit., p. 361.

corridors, probably because this was something to which the Soviets had signed an agreement right there in the Control Council.

The currency reform of June 1948 provided a typical example of the operating techniques and methods of the Soviets and the Allies in any Berlin situation. The East Mark was introduced by the Soviets as legal tender for the entire city; but, in spite of threats, they made no overt move to enforce its acceptance in the west sectors.¹¹ The West Mark was introduced in response to the Soviet action, and it was done as an extension of the West German currency reform and with no claims to validity outside the west sectors. The final resolution of the currency reform--which currency would be accepted where--was left to the Berlin Magistrat and Assembly, which decided in favor of the West. The decision was followed by riots in the area of city hall (east sector) in which several assemblymen were beaten. The next day the complete land blockade was imposed.

Once the blockade began, the Allied decision was again to sidestep rather than oppose it, although the methods involved in sidestepping the land blockade offered no guarantee

¹¹Davidson, op. cit., p. 94.

of success. The initial actions were to freeze in West Berlin all food supplies scheduled for the Soviet zone; and British authorities immediately suspended all deliveries of coal and steel from the Ruhr to the Soviet zone of Germany.¹² After the airlift had been in operation for a few days, President Truman in Washington made the decision that the United States was going to remain in Berlin; but at the time he gave no indication how it was to be done.¹³ The President's reliance upon an uncertain airlift and his later refusal of General Clay's suggestion that the blockade be challenged by a three-power armored column was due to a concern with the legal rights of the United States in Berlin, the lack of any written agreement concerning land access, and, Clay reports, to an expressed intention to avoid a direct confrontation, at least until the issue had been placed before the United Nations.¹⁴

In the few areas where the West was willing to risk a confrontation, the Soviets were not. Even before the airlift began, a Russian barrage balloon was seen flying in the

¹²New York Times, June 25, 1948.

¹³Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 454-5.

¹⁴Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 374.

Soviet zone, either near or in one of the air corridors. After a British protest, the balloon was lowered.¹⁵ During the airlift, occasional harassment of the Allied transports took place; and every so often there were Soviet protests against alleged violations of air traffic regulations by the West. No attempts were made, however, to physically disrupt the operations of the airlift through such things as communications jamming, construction that could interfere with the landing pattern, or the like.

Soviet pressure was applied to the instruments of the city government whose headquarters were physically located in East Berlin. This generally had the effect of forcing the democratic elements to set up new headquarters in the west sectors. The city police department was split on July 26, and the movement of the Magistrat to the west completed the split of the city government on November 30.¹⁶ These actions were followed by Soviet protests and allegations as to the illegality of the separate governmental structure in the west sectors, but these protests were never followed by attempts to actually change the situation. During the entire period

¹⁵New York Times, June 25, 1948.

¹⁶Davidson, The Berlin Blockade, pp. 171-4, 209-19.

of the blockade there were kidnappings and arrests of people in the west sectors by Soviet occupation authorities or East Berlin police; but these were hit-and-run affairs, and the Soviet military governor never admitted responsibility for them. It must be noted, however, that physical action was never taken against the more prominent anti-Soviet officials, again probably due to Soviet desire to keep Allied indignation within reasonable limits.¹⁷

2. DELIBERATENESS OF ACTION

A second characteristic of the Berlin blockade and airlift having applicability for the cold war as a whole was a certain deliberateness of action by the major powers involved. The pattern of challenge and response was such as to give the impression that each power was trying to avoid startling the other by any too-rapid change in the state of affairs.

The first example of deliberateness of action is the gradualness with which the Soviets established the blockade. The "creeping blockade" had begun as early as January with the tightening of regulations governing German passengers on

¹⁷Davidson, op. cit., p. 148.

interzonal trains.¹⁸ In March the Russians attempted to establish their right to check baggage and passengers on military trains running through East Germany, and rather than accept this the Allies cancelled their military train service altogether.¹⁹ The "baby airlift" was instituted at this time, and it operated until the restrictions were removed.

New restrictions followed shortly, and almost every day during May and June the Berlin press reported new restraints on the movement of goods and persons to and from the city.²⁰ Frequently, the restrictions were attributed to "technical reasons". The actions immediately preceding the blockade were as follows: June 16, the Soviet withdrawal from the Kommandatura; June 18, the prohibition by the Soviets of all vehicular and passenger train traffic between the Soviet zone of Germany and the west, and the imposition of strict inspection on all freight traffic moving by rail or canal; June 21, the Soviet currency reform; June 23, the Western currency reform

¹⁸Notes on the Blockade of Berlin, issued by the Control Commission for Germany (British Element), February, 1949.

¹⁹Clay, op. cit., pp. 358-9; Bennett, Bastion Berlin, pp. 35-9.

²⁰Davidson, p. 65.

in Berlin; and June 24, the ending of freight traffic between Berlin and the West. Even this did not completely seal off the city, for throughout the summer food was frequently smuggled into Berlin from both the west and the Soviet zones of Germany.²¹ New restrictions on travel between West Berlin and the east sector and neighboring areas of East Germany closed this hole in October and November. A food program operated by the Swedish Red Cross was terminated in December, and the International Red Cross, the last importers of food by means other than airlift, was forced to cease feeding operations in January.²²

The Soviets attempted to conduct a similar campaign against air traffic to Berlin, but here Western resistance was encountered from the very beginning. Since all necessary facilities for air operations were in the hands of the Western occupation forces, no progress whatsoever was made by the Russians.²³

The Allied actions followed a similarly deliberate pattern. The currency reform was instituted for West Germany on June 18; but it was not applied to West Berlin until

²¹Notes on the Blockade of Berlin, p. 14; Howley, pp. 210-1.

²²Davidson, op. cit., pp. 127-8. ²³Ibid., p. 199.

June 23, and then after Russian provocation. The blockade was instituted on June 24, the decision to start the airlift was made the following day, and on the next day the first supplies arrived in Berlin. Even this much swiftness of action, which gave the impression of deliberateness rather than indecision, was due to the efforts of General Clay, for at that time neither the controlling authorities in Washington nor Moscow placed much confidence in the ability of an airlift to supply Berlin.²⁴

The counter-blockade began, in a small way, on the same day as the blockade, when for "technical reasons" the British suspended coal and steel shipments from the Ruhr to the Soviet zone.²⁵ The next day, further restrictions on trade with the Soviets were announced by the U. S.-British Bipartite Economic Commission.²⁶ In July, the Allied authorities stopped rail traffic across the bizonal area between the Soviet zone and the non-German countries, again due to "technical difficulties".²⁷ In September, American authorities

²⁴Davidson, op. cit., pp. 109, 148.

²⁵New York Times, June 25, 1948.

²⁶Ibid., June 26, 1948.

²⁷Ibid., July 27, 1948.

began to enforce more stringently regulations concerning smuggling from the American to the Russian zones of Berlin, but the other Western allies did not follow the American example.²⁸ It was not until the beginning of 1949 that the Western counter-blockade was fully implemented.²⁹

3. TERRITORIAL LIMITATION OF CONFLICT

In a consideration of efforts to limit the area affected by the Berlin conflict and events directly resulting from that conflict, the concept of limitation of conflict must be viewed in two aspects. The first of these is the effect of the Berlin confrontation on the overall east-west relationship. This has to be regarded as inconclusive, for the Berlin situation was a symptom and not a cause of the generally bad relations between the United States and Russia. Instances of cooperation between the two powers were rare during the time period between the Czechoslovak coup and the ending of the war in Korea, but this cannot be blamed on the blockade of Berlin.

More noticeable an aspect of limitation of conflict is

²⁸Times, op. cit., October 22, 1948.

²⁹Howley, Berlin Command, p. 254.

the lack of direct interference by either power in territory for which the other had a legal basis of control. It was almost a case of whoever arrived first and laid claim to something would not have his claim directly challenged. In this aspect it can be considered that the highways and railroads running across East Germany were Soviet territory; but the air corridors, for which an agreement had been signed, belonged to the West.

The borders between the east and west sectors of Berlin were generally respected. In the early days of Allied occupation, arrangements had been made whereby each occupying power had authority over the police in his sector³⁰ and could control the removal of objectionable borough officials in his sector.³¹ During the time of the blockade, these arrangements were upheld.

There are no reported instances of Western interference in affairs in the east sector of Berlin. It is entirely possible that none occurred, because of the Western hands-off policy toward the affairs of the Berlin city government. This policy led to non-interference by the West even during

³⁰ Office of Military Government, U. S. Sector, Berlin, Berlin Sector: A Four-Year Report, July 1, 1945--September 1, 1949, p. 63.

³¹ Howley, op. cit., p. 254.

major events such as the city hall riots of June 23, 1948,³² and the demonstrations against the city assembly on September 6, in which it was apparent that the east sector police were making no effort to give protection to pro-west individuals.³³

Direct Russian interference in affairs in West Berlin and in the air corridors was the exception rather than the rule of operations during the blockade period. The Soviets made repeated threats and protests over the Allied use of the air corridors and occasionally they conducted flights in or near them, but no serious physical action was taken to hamper airlift operations. Counter-pressure to these threats was applied by the Allies in the buildup of American combat air-power in Europe.

Russian activity in West Berlin, once conditions became stabilized after the early days of four-power occupation, was also limited. For some months after the Western troops had entered the city in 1945, the personnel of the Red Army had continued the disorderly behavior that had been characteristic of the months of sole Russian occupation; but this ended in the face of Western threats to stop it by force if

³²Davidson, op. cit., pp. 95-8.

³³Ibid., pp. 185-7.

necessary.³⁴ Through the entire period of the blockade, there were frequent press reports of kidnappings and beatings of persons in the West sectors by communist police and Soviet military personnel. Several would-be kidnappers were caught by Western authorities, and they were always found to be members of the Soviet sector or Soviet zone police agencies.³⁵ As late as April 1949, Soviet troops attempted to occupy the locks in certain waterways in the British sector but were prevented by the arrival of British troops; and on the last day of the month, a raid was carried on by East sector police on a farm house in the British sector.³⁶ There is no record of raiders of this type ever being pursued beyond the borders into the east sector.

From the preceding paragraphs it can be seen that any development of respect for the territory controlled by the cold war opponent had, at least on the Russian side, a long way to go before it could be considered a rule of cold war operation. Although there were no attempts to enforce Russian ordinances within the west sectors, there was conducted against the people and authorities of West Berlin a level of

³⁴Howley, op. cit., pp. 65-74.

³⁵Berlin Sector, p. 66.

³⁶Davidson, p. 258.

violence near to that of guerrilla warfare whenever the Soviets thought they could get away with it. The Western lack of interference in the east sector, even in the cases of the major riots, were part of what W. Phillips Davidson terms as the Western tendency to interpret the Berlin situation in terms of law rather than power,³⁷ a tendency very common among those who do not consider themselves as having the power to interpret a situation otherwise. After the first few weeks of blockade, the Soviet consolidation of their position in East Berlin and their control of the everyday life in the sector were much more stringent than that exercised in the west sectors, so that East Berlin would have been a much more difficult target for hit-and-run operations even if any had been contemplated.

4. COLD WAR NEGOTIATION

Negotiations to reach a settlement of the Berlin problem were begun in Moscow on July 30, at the instigation of the Allies. After a month of generally unsatisfactory conferences between the three Western ambassadors and Stalin and Molotov, agreement was reached on a directive to be sent

³⁷Davidson, op. cit., p. 151.

to the four military governors. The directive provided for a removal of the blockade in exchange for the introduction of the East Mark as the sole currency for Berlin, with a vaguely worded provision for joint currency control by the military governors. Details of the implementation of the agreement were left to the military governors.

Historically a willingness to negotiate has implied a desire to reach some agreement on the subject under discussion. As far as the cold war is concerned, this implication cannot be considered valid. From the Soviet viewpoint, willingness to negotiate, especially when the negotiation is proposed by someone other than themselves, means a willingness to discuss and not necessarily anything more. In Moscow this lesson was expensively impressed upon the Western representatives. Walter Bedell Smith, the American ambassador to Russia and spokesman for the Western delegation, reports in his book that the idea of reaching an agreement was vital to the West as a barometer of Soviet sincerity; and that in order to get an agreement the Western representatives were willing to accept one that left many questions still open.³⁸ Other comments concerning the Moscow directive, particularly

³⁸Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1950_. p. 251.

those made by Americans working in the military governments of Germany and Berlin, were not so charitable.

The Soviet style of negotiation with the West was nothing new, and it would be repeated many times during the course of the cold war. The style basically consisted in the application of pressure of some kind in order to gain a concession, then negotiating to determine how much of that pressure would be removed after the concession had been gained. In Berlin the pressure of blockade had been applied in order to bring about either the postponement of the formation of a West German government or an Allied withdrawal from Berlin; the Moscow negotiators offered to remove part of the pressure in exchange for measures that would result in loss of Allied control of happenings in the city.

The technical discussions among the four military governors for the implementation of the Moscow directive were unsuccessful. Here each side took a harder line than had been taken in Moscow.³⁹ The failure to reach agreement can be explained by the real and imagined power relationships between the two antagonists. The Russians still thought that they could achieve their goals without making any concessions.⁴⁰

³⁹Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 371.

⁴⁰Davidson, The Berlin Blockade, p. 191.

The Western representatives, in Berlin if not in the Allied capitals, were by this time (early September, 1948) beginning to believe in the capability of the airlift to improve the Western bargaining position with the passage of time so that any concession made at this early date would be unnecessary.⁴¹

An exchange of notes and sporadic negotiation attempts in the United Nations Security Council occupied, unproductively, the remainder of the year. The ending of the blockade, when it did come, came about quickly, quietly, and easily. By the spring of 1949, the Russians realized that the blockade had failed and was now becoming a detriment to their success in other areas, such as the peace offensive that had begun in January.⁴² Once the power positions of the Berlin opponents had become approximately equal--the continuing blockade and Russian consolidation in the east sector being balanced by the counterblockade and a firm democracy supported by the successful airlift in the west--their political objectives could come into coincidence. The negotiations between Phillip Jessup of the United States and Jacob Malik of the

⁴¹Davidson, op. cit., pp. 183-4.

⁴²Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Re-appraised, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 54.

Soviet Union were conducted in secrecy and in an atmosphere totally unlike that of the earlier negotiations; that they would be successful was apparent almost from their beginning.⁴³ It is significant also that the first indication of Russian willingness to reach a negotiated solution to the Berlin problem came in an interview granted by Stalin to a Western correspondent rather than through any diplomatic method.⁴⁴

5. THE TECHNIQUES

The Berlin situation was one in which the positions of both Russia and the West were dependent upon the attitudes of the people of West Berlin. If they could be made to want the Western Allies to leave the city, the Allies would be forced to go. Even if the people became discouraged enough that they succumbed to the enticements offered them by the Soviets in the east sector, the position of the Allies would have become untenable. Efforts to persuade the West Berliners to accept Soviet rather than four-power control brought about the use of methods of warfare that were new in that here they were used alone rather than as adjuncts to military power.

⁴³Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1949, p. 591.

⁴⁴Davidson, op. cit., p. 254.

In Berlin, propaganda and promises of material assistance were used on a large scale, and pressure placed upon the West Berliners was expected to be transmitted to the Allied occupation forces.

Propaganda. The press and radio on both sides of divided Berlin were used to bolster or erode the morale of the West Berliners, depending upon the source. The Soviet-controlled press in East Berlin spread rumors of imminent Allied withdrawal⁴⁵ and repeatedly expressed belief that the airlift could not succeed in supplying Berlin.⁴⁶ Also promulgated were what have become the standard Communist denunciations of the West: "facist warmongers, reactionaries, imperialists", and the like.

Davidson reports that the vigorous communist propaganda effort in connection with Berlin was almost entirely ineffective.⁴⁷ This was due to two reasons. First, the facts of Berlin life were too available to the West Berliners; they could see for themselves; and any propaganda not conforming to the reality at hand would be immediately dismissed. Secondly, the Berliners had become highly critical of any

⁴⁵Davidson, op. cit., pp. 63-4.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 163-4.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 377.

propaganda after their long exposure to it as promulgated by the Nazis, the Soviets, and The West.

Allied propaganda in Berlin was less ambitious in its purpose. Its objectives were merely to reassure the people that the Allied occupation forces were planning to remain and that their ordeal was being closely observed by the outside world. Since Berliners could see the airlift in operation, and since important visitors frequently came to Berlin, it was generally successful.

Aid. Aid, either the delivery or promise of food and supplies from outside, was a more important lever than propaganda throughout the blockade period. If the Western Allies had not been able to supply the city by air, there would have been no question of their withdrawal from Berlin unless they were willing to fight for it. The counterblockade provided some leverage for exerting pressure upon the Russians by depriving them of sorely needed materials from the non-communist world.

While the blockade was in effect, the Soviets used offers of relief to try to influence actions of the people of West Berlin. One of their levers was the issuance to workers of a free warm noonday meal that could be withdrawn if the political action of the workers was not in accord with

Soviet desires.⁴⁸ At one time during the blockade, the Russians attempted to win the allegiance of the West Berliners by offering to provide food in the east sector for all citizens of the city.⁴⁹ This offer was supplemented shortly afterward by Soviet offers of work to all Berliners unemployed because of the blockade.⁵⁰ When it is considered that during this time the West Berliners were subjected to stringent food rationing and that there was high unemployment due to lack of raw materials, it is a tribute to their resistance that these offers were not accepted by more than a very small percentage of the population.

The use of intermediaries. The final characteristic of the Berlin blockade in its implications for the future was the use of indirect pressure, applied by or through intermediaries, instead of pressure applied directly by one power to another. Along this line, the Russians showed an early preference for mob action as an arm of policy;⁵¹ and they also made frequent use of the East Berlin police for acts of

⁴⁸ Davidson, op. cit., p. 98.

⁴⁹ USSR Information Bulletin, August 11, 1948, p. 459.

⁵⁰ Howley, Berlin Command, p. 245.

⁵¹ Davidson, The Berlin Blockade, pp. 181-2, 192.

violence against citizens of West Berlin. The blockade itself was a large-scale attempt to make the hardships imposed upon the people of West Berlin bring about the departure of the Western occupation forces in order to have them alleviated. Only during periods of negotiation was direct pressure brought to bear upon the Allies, and then it was only psychological.

When action that could be considered as offensive emanated from the west sectors of Berlin, it was generally caused by the West Berliners themselves rather than the occupation forces. In most cases of this nature, such as the splitting of the branches of the city government, the mass meetings, and the establishment of the Free University, the Berliners were acting on their own behalf and not as instruments of Allied policy. Yet, if the Allies had a policy of open resistance to the Russians and if they had chosen to implement it through the use of the Berliners, this is a logical way in which it could have been done. On one occasion when the West Berlin police were ordered to crack down on smugglers who were removing goods from the American sector, they acted eagerly to carry out the American policy.⁵² It is also noticeable that pressures applied in areas not directly

⁵²New York Times, September 27, 1948.

related to the blockade, such as the Marshall Plan and NATO, were instrumental in its ending.⁵³

6. THE LESSONS

From the Berlin blockade and airlift and the events connected to them can be determined through hindsight the early development of a pattern in which the cold war would be conducted. Both major antagonists in Berlin made obvious efforts to avoid direct confrontation between them, but they still applied pressure and counter-pressure to try to gain their objectives. The restraint used by each side was due in part to the position of Berlin as an important but not vital interest to either, one not worth risking war over, at least until all other means of solution had been exhausted. In Berlin the Allies chose to reply to the blockade, which in past situations could have been considered as an act of war, by using non-violent means that offered no guarantees of success; and the Russians, knowingly or otherwise, did not back the West into such a position that their only recourse would be to military action.

The deliberateness of action, followed intentionally

⁵³Davidson, op. cit., p. 251.

or otherwise by both sides, helped to reduce the possibility of an inadvertent outbreak of war over Berlin, as did the maintenance of diplomatic contact between the opposing powers at all times during the crises. There was tacit acceptance by each power of the unchallengeability of the other by direct military means in the territory under his control, but indirect challenges by the Russians were frequent. In general, more respect was shown for the territory of the opponent than if the powers had been at war, but less than if they had been really at peace.

The pattern of action in Berlin developed partly in accord with the intentions of the actors, partly accidentally or even contrary to their intentions. Regardless of the reasons, its development was accepted, and neither power tried to change it. This pattern provided a set of precedents which, by virtue of having been used before without arousing excessive objection by the opponent, were available to be followed again whenever convenient. Some of the precedents were extremely indistinct in their form; there would later be added the details and embellishments to expand the precedents into a system of conflict.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPING SYSTEM

1. KOREA AND LIMITED WAR

The Korean War provided the first large-scale shooting confrontation between forces of the United States and forces supported by the Soviet Union. Here again each side tried, this time with greater success than in Berlin, to conduct their conflict through intermediaries. The United States took advantage of a Russian boycott of the United Nations Security Council to successfully introduce resolutions calling for, on June 25, 1950, an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces and requesting, on June 27, all UN members to give such assistance as may be necessary to the Republic of Korea.¹ The United Nations established a unified military command, under the leadership of the United States, to resist the North Korean invasion; and the command was directed to report to the Security Council whenever it deemed appropriate.

A word is necessary here to place in their proper perspective the roles played in the Korean War by the United

¹Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950), pp. 47-8.

States and Russia. First, the United States played, from the beginning, a leading role in Korea because it was the only Western power with immediate interests in the country; and it had acquired these as a result of the power vacuum created by the Japanese defeat in the Second World War. Secondly, the United States was the only Western power with military forces in position where they could be, and were, moved quickly to Korea. The call to the Security Council was made to acquire UN backing for the protection of interests the United States was maintaining for what it considered the benefit of the non-communist world as a whole and from which the country had or would receive no significant advantages. Finally, the United Nations had no military forces of its own to carry on any resistance, so a unified command had to be established under one nation. Considering the ability of various nations to contribute to this force, the United States was the logical choice for command.

Russian participation in the Korean War was not so direct. Although Russian equipment was present in great quantity, only the armies of North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic were utilized. There is even a certain doubt concerning the extent of Russian control of the Communist effort in Korea. Most earlier works on the subject credit Russia

with instigating and controlling the conflict, with the Chinese army merely being used to carry out the policies of Moscow. Recently, however, a new school of thought has emphasized Chinese rather than Russian initiation of the conflict.² The one thing reasonably certain about the Russian involvement is that the plans for the war were discussed at the Moscow meeting between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung in December 1949.

Regardless of the degree or reason for involvement, it is clear that the United Nations' forces were acting in accord with policies of the United States and the Communist forces were acting in accord with policies of Russia. With these facts in mind, the Korean War had been considered by historians in various ways: as the success of collective security in resistance to aggression, as a sign of the determination of the West to resist Communist expansion, and as the instance that caused further Russian attempts to extend their influence to be made through economic warfare, propaganda, and subversion. As its contribution to the development of the cold war system of conflict, the Korean War introduced the first instance of limited war between the Western and Communist worlds.

²The position of Russian responsibility for the Korean War is taken by Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 45; and David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy Since Stalin,

With the idea of limited war came the principle of sanctuary for the opposing forces in areas other than that of direct conflict.

The amount of concern expressed since the Korean War about the escalation of limited wars into major ones has shown the flimsiness of limited war as a principle. W. W. Rostow, writing about the Korean War, mentioned an implicit set of rules for conducting hostilities. He said that when a truce line was crossed, the aggrieved party could counter-attack by any means available within his own boundaries and it would not be taken by the initiator as justification for enlarging the area of hostilities or for launching major war. He said that the maintenance of the truce line, and the implicit rules governing action on either side of it, have been the basis on which major war has been prevented since the Second World War.³ In Korea, the development of this implicit set of rules did not come about in a manner calculated

(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960), p. 60. Increased stress is given to Chinese influence in the origination of the war in Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

³W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 244-5.

to inspire confidence for future action. In fact, evidence points to the contrary. In an examination of the development of these rules, the Korean truce line has to be viewed more closely in four instances: the crossing of the 38th parallel by the forces of the United Nations, the failure to bomb north of the Yalu River, the Chinese intervention and counter-offensive of the spring of 1951, and the war at sea and behind the UN lines.

Crossing the parallel. The United Nations' resolutions passed immediately after the invasion by the North Koreans provided means to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area",⁴ with no apparent intention to extend the ground war into North Korea. Between this time and the time when the UN General Assembly resolution on October 7, 1950, endorsed "all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea",⁵ there can be seen the ease with which the objectives of a war can be expanded as the initial ones are achieved.

Between August 7 and 11 the North Korean advance was stopped short of its goal of ejecting the UN forces from

⁴United Nations Bulletin, Vol. IX No. 2; July 15, 1950; p. 43.

⁵United Nations Bulletin, Vol. IX No. 9; November 1, 1950; p. 449.

Korea, and the UN forces within the Pusan perimeter began to rapidly increase their strength. At this time, the behavior of Jacob Malik, now back in the Russian seat on the Security Council, suggested a willingness to compromise on his earlier terms for ending the war.⁶ In the United States, however, success brought a hardening line. On August 17, American Ambassador to the United Nations Warren Austin expressed his government's desire to have the UN forces liberate all of Korea from the Communists.⁷ Within the next several days a more aggressive stance was taken by several prominent military leaders, and repudiation of this new stand by President Truman led to the resignation of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in favor of someone considered more moderate in his approach.⁸

As early as September 19, Sygman Rhee of South Korea had announced his intention to pursue North Korean troops across the 38th parallel of latitude, regardless of UN intentions. On October 1, the day Rhee's intention was carried

⁶Whiting, op. cit., pp. 74-6.

⁷United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 483th meeting, Aug. 17, 1950, No. 30.

⁸Whiting, op. cit., p. 96.

out, General MacArthur publicly ordered North Korea to surrender.⁹ MacArthur's proposal to move UN forces northward across the 38th parallel had been backed by Washington and London even before the action by the Korean troops;¹⁰ and when his order was carried out on October 7, it was endorsed the same day by the United Nations General Assembly.

The decision to move the ground war into North Korea can be seen as a conscious expansion of the war, brought on by success in attaining the earlier objectives and the desire to remove the conditions that enabled the war to be started in the first place. The possible retaliatory expansion of the war by the Communists was considered, and warnings were made by Washington against Chinese intervention.¹¹ Announcements from Peking that China would enter the war were in general taken lightly, and there are conflicting opinions even now as to whether or not that country would have entered

⁹Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, (Washington, 1951), p. 3482.

¹⁰David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 100-4. John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, (Cambridge: Bellmap Press, 1959), pp. 95, 101-2.

¹¹Whiting, pp. 97-8.

in force if the UN advance had stopped at the waist of Korea and not gone on toward the Yalu.

Sanctuary beyond the Yalu. The decision not to cross the Yalu River by aircraft was made against the recommendation of the United Nations' commander in the field, and Great Britain and France exercised some influence on the decision of President Truman.¹² Nevertheless, the Yalu was crossed on occasion. On August 27, 1950, the Communist Chinese accused aircraft of the United States of having machine-gunned some Chinese facilities in Manchuria. Allen Whiting reports in his RAND study that within a few days American authorities conceded the possibility of a "mistake" and offered compensation, provided appropriate inspection of the alleged damage could be made.¹³ Also reported is an attack by two U.S. jets on a Soviet air base in Siberia.¹⁴ After the Chinese intervention in the war, it became American policy to bomb the Korean side of the Yalu bridges, increasing the risk of accidental overflight but at the same time showing willingness to add to the hazards of these missions by refusing to order

¹²Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 130-1.

¹³Whiting, op. cit., p. 97.

¹⁴Spanier, op. cit., p. 111.

attacks on the air defense emplacements on the Chinese side of the river.¹⁵

General MacArthur continually advocated the extension of the air war into China. His pressure on President Truman was somewhat balanced, however, by the contrary recommendations of Secretary of State Acheson and the representatives of the Allies in Washington. Although the policy of bombing north of the Yalu never came into being, it is significant that it was considered; and the expressed reason for not extending the war was avoidance of further pressure on the Soviet Union to enter.¹⁶

The role of China. The Chinese intervention in October 1950 was another conscious expansion of the war. In August and September a massive redeployment of the Chinese army had positioned many of its best troops in Manchuria. It seems now that the final decision to intervene was dependent, as was advertised at the time by Chou En-lai, upon the crossing of the 38th parallel by the American forces, although this decision could have been reversed later if the UN advance had not gone as far north as it did.¹⁷ It is entirely

¹⁵Whiting, op. cit., pp. 138-9.

¹⁶Spanier, op. cit., pp. 248-9. ¹⁷Whiting, p. 103.

possible that the movement of the United States Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Straits in June 1950 had prevented a Chinese move in that direction while the majority of the American forces were tied up in Korea, for there were previous indications that such an invasion was imminent.¹⁸

The Chinese intervention was carried out with the same deliberateness of action as was characteristic of the cold war operations in Berlin. The initial Chinese penetration into Korea was made in the middle of October; and the first contacts were made with ROK forces on October 26 and American forces on November 2. Then, on November 7, the Chinese "volunteers" broke off action, and things were quiet on the front until the counterattack on November 26, in response to MacArthur's "end the war" offensive.¹⁹ Whiting lists several possible reasons for the November lull, and among them is a Chinese desire to observe and evaluate the UN response to their entry and any immediate effects of this entry on further expansion of the war.²⁰

Once the Chinese intervention had been brought about successfully, it again became easy for one side to expand the

¹⁸Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 49.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 116-7. ²⁰Ibid., p. 132.

war objectives. The Chinese offensive in the spring of 1951 could by no means be called limited and was best described by Admiral Struble as "a major war confined to a small area". This confinement seems almost entirely to have been due to Chinese inability to extend the war territorially any more than they did, particularly in view of the American commitment to defend Taiwan. The Chinese advance down the Korean peninsula had as its objective the removal of the UN forces from Korea, and no special recognition was given to the pre-war truce line when it was crossed.

Non-extensions. Some veterans of the Korean War speak of an agreement whereby, in return for the failure of the United States' aircraft to bomb targets in Manchuria or to pursue Communist aircraft beyond the Yalu River, the Communists would not attack the United Nations' fleet offshore or conduct air strikes against targets behind the UN lines in South Korea. There was no such agreement, although it seems as though this limitation was intended by both sides and that a tacit understanding did develop over a period of time. General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, said in a speech that any Russian limitation was out of fear of retaliation rather than respect for any international

proprieties.²¹ Whatever the reasons, there were indications of positive efforts by the Soviets, if not their Asian allies, to limit these areas of conflict.

One indicator of Russian limitation of the conflict was in the composition of the air force supplied to China by the Soviet Union. The MIG-15, like the F-86 flown by the American pilots, was a high-altitude interceptor; and the Chinese air force did not contain any modern aircraft suitable for operations against ground targets.²² Any air attacks on targets behind the UN lines or at sea could have been carried out only by strike aircraft delivered by Russia specifically for that purpose, and an act of this nature would open the possibility of immediate nuclear retaliation. Any attacks behind UN lines, even in South Korea, were carried on by Communist guerrillas, probably more cheaply and more effectively than they could have been done by air.

After the destruction of the North Korean PT boat force early in the war, a fairly intensive mining campaign was the only Communist effort made against UN ships operating in Korean waters. Even here the restraining influence of Russia was

²¹Address by General Hoyt Vandenberg to the California State Chamber of Commerce, November 29, 1951; quoted in U.S. News and World Report, December 14, 1951.

²²Vandenberg, loc. cit.

evident in the mines supplied to the North Koreans. The mines were of an obsolescent type; and, had mines of more advanced design been used, they would have been considerably more costly to combat.²³

The Korean truce talks which began in June 1951 were the result, as in Berlin, of secret conversations between Soviet UN Delegate Jacob Malik and representatives of the Western powers in New York. By this time both sides were willing to settle for a peace without victory. For the first time in the war both sides had the identical political-military objective of an armistice based on the continued partition of Korea.²⁴ The Soviets knew that the forces they were supporting could not win; the United States considered the cost of victory to be higher than the country was willing to pay.

The opening of the truce talks and the decision of the United Nations not to continue the advance up the Korean peninsula served the Soviet purposes as well as a cease-fire would have. The talks themselves gave further indications of the Communist negotiating style previously demonstrated in Berlin, and they showed again that the act of negotiating

²³James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations--Korea, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 372.

²⁴Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 365.

can be an end in itself and is not necessarily indicative of desire to reach agreement.²⁵ The talks dragged on for two years, with no apparent Communist desire for agreement so long as they were not losing territory. David Rees reports that the truce agreement was finally signed due, secondarily, to the death of Stalin, but primarily to American threats to expand the war, by atomic weapons if necessary, into China.²⁶

The example of the Korean War, which has not been repeated, but which bears certain similarities to the developing Viet Nam situation, shows the weaknesses of limited war as a part of the cold war system of conflict. The war in Korea was limited only when the limiting power considered it in his interest to do so in each particular situation, when his potential gains were either unlikely to be realized through escalation of the war or would not be worth the increased cost of such escalation. In limited war, Korea showed that it is easy for the winner to increase his objectives once he has achieved his initial ones, and that the losing side must

²⁵ A detailed analysis of the Communist negotiating style demonstrated in Korea is presented in the book by the Senior Delegate representing the United Nations at the Korean Armistice Conference; C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate, (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1955).

²⁶ Rees, op. cit., pp. 402-420.

resort to more and more drastic measures if he wants to win or even stabilize a war going against him. The Korean opponents were unwilling to settle for less than victory until each had had a chance to attain it and failed because his enemy poured more reserves into the contest. In the nuclear balance of terror situation, escalation would be even more dangerous for both sides than it would have been in Korea. Both sides have since remained aware of this danger, and their awareness has helped to direct their conduct of the cold war away from such situations since then.

2. COVERT POWER PROJECTION

While the limited but still hot war was taking place on the Korean peninsula, other areas around the world were scenes of East-West conflict conducted on a violence level far below that of open war and in which the stakes of the great powers involved were far less than they were in Korea. These were the instances of shadow warfare, the projection of force and counterforce by covert means in which the level of commitment is kept so low that the chains of command from Washington and Moscow to their respective participants could at the time be but faintly traced. In the cold war or non-war system of conflict, there have been instances in which both opponents have relied completely upon projection of power by covert means to attain war objectives and have accepted defeats resulting from such methods of operation rather than resorting to open intervention. Whether such techniques have resulted in success or failure, the sponsoring power has not admitted any direct involvement and has been extremely reluctant to even claim any connection with whatever was happening in the country in question.

Two important instances of covert projection of power during the time with which this paper is concerned are the

cases of Iran and Guatemala. In each of these the factions friendly to the United States were successful. In Cuba, in later years, Soviet-influenced elements brought about a take-over by methods having some similarity to those used in the earlier instances but that did not repeat their mistakes.

In the two earlier cases that will be described briefly, and in the Cuban venture, there is even now little that can be proved about the great power involvement. There are, however, several works containing undocumented accounts or speculations that have never been denied or affirmed by the countries concerned. Interesting as they are, these accounts remain unproved; and the exact degree of involvement by the cold war opponents remains undetermined.²⁷

Iran. Soviet military occupation of Iran had been accomplished during the Second World War, and after the war Stalin had refused to withdraw his army from the country. The problem was taken to the United Nations; but, even while the fruitless debate was going on, a strong protest by President Truman was influential in bringing about a Soviet

²⁷Two of these insufficiently documented accounts that were consulted but not cited are: Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962); and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, (New York: Random House, 1964).

withdrawal.²⁸ Even as the troops were being withdrawn, however, the organization of the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) Party was being strengthened. Mass organizations of the type common to Soviet-dominated countries were brought into being, and a systematic pattern of violence became evident throughout the country. This violence included an attempt on the life of the Shah of Iran in February 1949, and the assassination of the Premier, General Rasmara, in February 1951.²⁹

The new Prime Minister was Dr. Mohammed Mossadeqh, an ardent nationalist. In the next two years, Mossadeqh nationalized the Abadan refinery of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, severed diplomatic relations with Britain, and turned increasingly toward the Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party, although outlawed, became increasingly active in the country; and Mossadeqh came more and more under its control.³⁰ In May 1953, an Iranian request for financial aid from the United States was accompanied by indications that, if the aid were

²⁸ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1956), Vol. II, p. 95.

²⁹ James D. Atkinson, The Edge of War, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 248.

³⁰ Henry C. Atyeo, "Political Developments in Iran, 1951-1954," Middle Eastern Affairs, August-September, 1954; David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 210.

not granted as requested, the alternative would be increasingly close economic and military relations with the Soviet Union. In mid-July the Shah attempted to depose Mossadegh from the Premiership, but riots in Tehran forced his reappointment.³¹

During that summer, there were certain suspicious happenings involving American nationals. U. S. Brigadier General H. N. Schwarzkopf, who had recently spent seven years training and assisting the semi-militarized constabulary of Iran and who had many close friends in influential positions in the Iranian army, made a vacation trip to Iran in August to renew old friendships. Other people were vacationing elsewhere, and those in Switzerland included American Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of the Shah.³²

On August 16 it was suddenly announced that the Shah had again deposed Dr. Mossadegh as Prime Minister and that General Zahedi was designated to take his place. Mossadegh refused to accept the order, and the Shah and his family suddenly left the country. On the 19th, rioting broke out in Tehran, with demonstrators proclaiming loyalty to the Shah.

³¹Dallin, p. 211.

³²Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 250-1.

At the same time the army declared for the Shah, and Mossadegh and his followers were arrested. General Zahedi was installed Prime Minister, and three weeks later it was announced that President Eisenhower had made available \$45 million for emergency economic aid to Iran.³³

There are a couple of interesting sidelights to this affair. One of these is that between the time of the departure of the Shah from the country and the defeat of Mossadegh by the army, the Tudeh party was in control of Tehran but did not move to take over the government. One source reports that this action was not taken because the Tudeh leaders doubted their ability to defeat the non-Communist forces, and that it had been made clear that Moscow would not provide overt assistance.³⁴ Another sidelight is that shortly after Mossadegh was arrested, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran, Anatol Lavrentiev, suffered a heart attack and was incapacitated for nearly a month.³⁵

Guatemala. The cold war conflict in Guatemala simmered even longer than that of Iran before coming to a head.

³³Dallin, op. cit., pp. 211-3.

³⁴Ibid., p. 213.

³⁵New York Times, September 2 and 9, 1953.

By the time the showdown took place, Communist control of the country was farther advanced than it had been in Iran; but some Communist mistakes made it even easier to bring their control to an end.

Communist influence in Guatemala had begun to be felt in the late 1940's in the government of Juan Jose Arevalo, although the Communist Party itself was illegal in the country.³⁶ The leading known Communists in Guatemala made several trips to Moscow during the period of the Arevalo government; and the expected successor to Arevalo, a strong anti-Communist, was mysteriously assassinated shortly before the presidential election was due to be held. In the election of 1950, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, the choice of the Communist-dominated political parties, was elected president.

During the years of the Arbenz government, the Communist pattern of consolidation shown earlier in Eastern Europe was closely followed.³⁷ The labor unions and other mass organizations became more important in the political power structure of the country, and a people's militia was in the

³⁶U. S. Government, Department of State, A Case History of Communist Penetration: Guatemala, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 18-9.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 30-5.

process of being established. Of particular significance to the United States was the changing orientation of Guatemala on the international scene. Close ties were maintained by the Communist Party of Guatemala, legal since 1951, with the international communist movement; and economic and diplomatic relations were increased between Guatemala and the countries of the Soviet bloc. Even more important to the United States, Guatemala was becoming a base from which Soviet influence and subversive elements were being spread into the Western Hemisphere.³⁸

In Guatemala the mistake of attracting the attention of the United States through a blackmail threat such as that made by Mossadegh in May 1953 was not repeated. However, another opportunity for action was given. Colonel Castillo Armas, an anti-Communist Guatemalan officer, had been imprisoned following an unsuccessful coup attempt when it was becoming apparent that Arbenz would be elected president in 1950. In 1951, he had escaped from jail and fled the country. In early 1954, he was in Honduras trying to organize forces to overthrow the Arbenz regime; and by June he had under his command some two hundred exiles whose arms and equipment, it

³⁸Op. cit., pp. 30-5; Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 275-80.

is suspected, were supplied by the United States. His occasion to attack came when a report was made public by the U. S. Department of State that a shipment of Czechoslovak small arms had been loaded aboard a Swedish ship at Stettin and was destined for the Guatemalan people's militia.³⁹ Castillo Armas and his band moved across the border but were contained by the Guatemalan army. The army, however, had been only slightly penetrated by Communist influence and was fearful of plans that the Communists might have for its members as individuals. It feared also that the people's militia would be used to consolidate Communist control, and so it refused to allow the militia to be armed and finally forced the resignation of Arbenz.⁴⁰ The new government, in which Castillo Armas emerged as president, was strongly pro-United States and anti-Communist; and the Party in Guatemala was again forced to go underground.

An evaluation. The governmental upheavals in Iran and Guatemala were examples of the conduct of a great-power conflict on an intermediary level in which neither great power could be held responsible by the other for anything

³⁹Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954, p. 835.

⁴⁰Schneider, op. cit., pp. 310-2.

that happened in the country concerned, although each knew of the other's involvement. In neither instance were the stakes unimportant, but the outcomes would not be significant on the levels of national security or even prestige since the presence of direct great-power involvement would not be positively determined. All that could result from episodes such as these, if the great-power involvement remained covert, would be a slight increase in the world-wide influence of one major power at the expense of the other. This should not be enough to make the loser resort to nuclear warfare to redeem himself.

In this view it is necessary to consider briefly the Communist takeover in Cuba. Castro consolidated his position in the country and got rid of American influence before proclaiming himself a Marxist. By the time this was done, any significant internal opposition had been eliminated. The United States chose to combat the takeover by the same means as had been successful in Guatemala, but here the circumstances were different enough to both force discernable American involvement and to result in a complete defeat for the invaders. Even when confronted with defeat for the elements they were supporting and a major loss of face for the government of the United States, President Kennedy and his staff chose to accept

the consequences of their miscalculations rather than resorting to overt use of force to accomplish their purpose.

From these events there has been established the pattern of covert power projection that has become one of the primary channels of cold war conduct. The exact extent to which it is used cannot be determined, because there are taking place so many instances in which cold war manipulation is possible but doubtful. The techniques used, varying in degree from guerrilla warfare to minor instances of espionage and subversion, are such that it is hard to prove the presence of the controlling elements if they do exist. Yet these techniques can bring about results favorable to an interested foreign nation, and so their place is assured among the important elements of the cold war system.

3. THE NON-INTERVENTIONS

As part of the efforts by both the United States and The Soviet Union to avoid a direct confrontation between them, there have been in recent years certain instances of inaction, begun in the case of the Berlin blockade and repeated elsewhere, that have become part of the pattern of cold war conduct. In the Berlin confrontation, neither power would overtly intervene in areas where the opponent had legal basis for

control or where legal basis was indistinct, but the opponent was in physical possession of a piece of real estate. The areas included here were the two halves of the city, the land access routes, and the air corridors.

This pattern of action was reinforced in later years. The Soviets did not openly assist the Tudeh party in taking control of the Iranian government while the Shah was out of the country in August 1953; and, having received no legal invitation due to the shortage of time, they did not render aid to the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954. Later, when the Americans and British acted upon the invitations of the legal governments to send troops into Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, the Soviet opposition took only the form of protests.

The United States has followed the same pattern of action. During the uprisings in East Berlin in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, only moral support against the Soviets was given by the West. The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was interference by the United States in a Soviet-controlled territory, but it was intended to be covert; and at the crucial point the American decision was to remain within the established pattern of conduct and refrain from overt intervention on the side of the invaders.

During the cold war years, the failure of the United

States and Russia to intervene openly in each other's affairs was a result of decisions that, quite likely, gave little concern, at the time, to the establishment of a pattern of action. Yet, from then a pattern of action did develop. By the end of 1956, there could be discerned the principle of action by which each side would encourage dissident elements within the territory of the other and use any incidents resulting from their actions as cold war propaganda. However, except for any covert action that may be carried out, no other measures would be taken. This principle of action demonstrated an acceptance by the United States of Russian control over Eastern Europe that would not be challenged by American military power, and it indicated a shifting of the primary cold war battlefield from Europe to the vast areas of the world where neither power had control.

4. POLITICAL WARFARE

Historical development. The concept of political warfare is a Marxist one, and it is based upon the inseparability of peace and war as long as capitalism exists anywhere in the world.⁴¹ From the beginning, to the Marxists, "struggle" or

⁴¹Robert Strausz-Maupe et. al., Protracted Conflict, (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 109.

"battle" did not necessarily include the use of armed force. The status of political rather than military warfare was denoted in Trotsky's plan "to stop the war, not to conclude peace" in February 1918, and the uniqueness of such an idea almost brought about its success against Germany.⁴² Lenin's philosophy of war was dependent to a great extent upon the work of Clausewitz, and his efforts to influence the men of the German army during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations showed his appreciation of the non-military aspects of warfare.⁴³ The elimination of the dividing line between peace and war was further expanded upon in the theoretical writings of Lenin and Stalin, and the entire history of the Soviet Union can be looked upon as a series of attempts to expand Communist influence into Europe and Asia by means other than open warfare.⁴⁴

The First World War saw the large scale use of economic warfare and startling developments in the fields of public opinion and propaganda, all of which were applicable to use in time of peace as well as in time of war. In the First World War, when vast conscript armies took the field and were

⁴²E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961) Volume III., p. 36.

⁴³Stefan T. Possony, A Century of Conflict, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 21-3.

⁴⁴Atkinson, op. cit., p. 63.

in turn supported by millions of workers in munitions and supply industries and when it became possible for the first time to communicate with these millions on a mass basis, the total morale of the nation became of prime importance.⁴⁵ In the postwar Western world, however, these developments were considered as part of warfare and fell into disuse as writers and thinkers continued to concern themselves with the traditional distinctions between war and peace rather than about the changes that were beginning to muddle the differences between the two. James Atkinson calls attention to the attitude, especially strong in the United States, that such activities as espionage and intelligence work were excusable and even acceptable during a state of declared war but that they were not quite the sort of thing that nice people did when the shooting was all over.⁴⁶

In the Second World War, although overshadowed by the vast military campaigns, the elements of political warfare were employed on a scale greater than that of the earlier conflict. Psychological and economic warfare were used more extensively than in the past, and guerilla warfare and resistance movements took place in the enemy-occupied countries.

⁴⁵Terence H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 54-5.

⁴⁶Atkinson, Edge of War, p. 109.

Still these methods continued to be looked upon in the West as adjuncts to, rather than as substitutes for military action.⁴⁷

When the Second World War ended, Russia continued her efforts at political warfare, turning them now against the West. Since 1945, Professor Atkinson considers this form of warfare to have been brought by the Soviets to a near-perfect state. He cites as the conditions making possible the full development of political warfare four revolutions of modern times: the revolution in education that brought about the mass audience for propaganda and a large intelligentsia capable of acting upon it, the revolution in communications enabling the propagandist to contact his mass audience, the revolution in weapons that makes other forms of warfare less attractive, and the revolution effected by the politicization of warfare, the merging of politics and war brought about by the combination of Marxist theory and Communist experience.⁴⁸

The nature of political warfare. The thing that is here called political warfare has been considered by other writers under various names. Atkinson called it unconventional warfare, but that term has since come to be restricted

⁴⁷Qualter, op. cit., p.125.

⁴⁸Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 272-5.

to guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. It has been called cold war, but that term better describes the system within which it is used. It has also been referred to as competitive co-existence. The originators and users of these terms are all concerned with the same thing, and that is the manner of warfare by which the cold war is conducted. This manner of warfare is one that includes the use of propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, espionage, subversion, strikes, civil disturbances, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare; and it includes their use against an opponent with which the protagonist is technically at peace. None of the techniques listed here is new in itself; what is new is the way in which they are employed on a massed and coordinated scale as a substitute for, rather than an adjunct to, military action. The technique of political warfare is a synthesis of all the other techniques, conducted on any scale appropriate to the ends desired.⁴⁹

The weapons of political warfare. Louis Fischer has described the cold war as a competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the friendship, good will, diplomatic support, allegiance, and alliance of other countries.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 196-7.

⁵⁰Louis Fischer, Russia, America, and the World, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 8.

Such objectives, all of which are intangible, are not readily attainable by the overt use of military means, but they do lend themselves to being achieved through the non-military methods of political warfare. Most of the political warfare techniques that have been listed above can be grouped under the general heading of projection of power by covert means, but even covert projection of power can be used best in combination with other efforts. The two overt means of attracting support throughout the world that have been most adaptable to the cold war system are propaganda and economic warfare, the latter conducted primarily through trade restrictions and foreign economic assistance. Each of these techniques can be used in an entirely non-violent atmosphere, can get certain results, and can safely be carried to any degree considered necessary by the nation using it. There have been a number of excellent studies done on each of these techniques,⁵¹ so here there will be discussed only briefly their use in the cold war system.

Propaganda, in its current use in international relations, has been defined as "the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes

⁵¹A listing of excellent studies on both propaganda and economic warfare is contained in the bibliography to this paper.

of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reactions of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist.⁵² In the cold war system, propaganda, due in part to the revolutions in communications and education around the world, has become amenable to use to an extent much greater than ever before. Its particular significance in the cold war is that it, like many of the other techniques of political warfare, is here used on a large scale for the first time as a substitute for, rather than an auxiliary to, military engagement.

Cold war propaganda is distributed by both the United States and the Soviet Union through almost every conceivable medium, although the Russians spend considerably more money and effort on it than does the United States.⁵³ Each nation has its own official propaganda agency, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the United States Information Agency. Each has

⁵²Qualter, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵³A detailed and scholarly examination of the Soviet propaganda organization is contained in Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). This author knows of no comparable study of the American propaganda organization.

its official government radio station--ours is prohibited from operating in this country--which operates in many languages throughout the world. Both sides use magazines, trade fairs, cultural exchanges, and education programs generally offered to students from third countries. Russia also uses various front organizations and the foreign Communist parties whenever convenient, while propaganda organs of this type have generally been unavailable to the United States. The basic advantages of propaganda as a weapon for both sides have lain in its cheapness, its ease of propagation, and its suitability to combination with other cold war techniques.

Propaganda in the cold war system is a weapon that has been used with great effect by both sides to take maximum advantage of opponents' policy errors or of circumstances innately favorable to one's own interests. The United States exploited the propaganda elements in the Hungarian uprising of 1956 with good results, and she was able to use this incident to help isolate the Russian position in the Suez crisis. Russia did the same with the U-2 incident and the cancelled Summit meeting of May 1960.⁵⁴ The Soviets have effectively used the twin themes of nationalism and anti-colonialism in

⁵⁴David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 414, 510-1.

their appeals to the under-developed world, and they have continually preyed upon the universal desire for peace and fear of nuclear war.⁵⁵ Yet propaganda had its distinct limitations, the first being that talk can only be effective so long without being followed up by action. Propaganda, especially of the Soviet variety, tends to be repetitious; and it is said to lose its appeal as the level of audience sophistication rises.⁵⁶ Propaganda is most effective when it had as its subject something against which the opponent is unable to build a counter-argument, and efforts which are seriously combatted by the cold war adversary can generally be neutralized.

Foreign economic assistance is best utilized in the cold war system in conjunction with an active propaganda campaign. It was first used as a weapon against Russian expansion by the United States in Greece and Turkey in 1947, and its success there and in Western Europe prompted its use by the Soviets in the early 1950's. Foreign assistance within the cold war system can be given for any of several purposes; its value to the giver is dependent upon its effect on

⁵⁵Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, pp. 300-1.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 312-3. The decreasing effectiveness of Soviet and Allied propaganda during the ten months of the Berlin blockade is shown in W. Davidson, The Berlin Blockade, pp. 375-80.

the political behavior of the recipient nation.⁵⁷

The American foreign assistance program is primarily, but not entirely, a result of the cold war. It is motivated by a combination of altruism, the long-range desire for a better world, and the short-term goal of increasing the influence of the United States in a specific area or preventing the growth of Soviet or Chinese influence in that area.⁵⁸

The Soviet foreign assistance program to non-Communist countries, which has been referred to as economic penetration designed to lead to political takeover,⁵⁹ is, according to all evidence, conducted almost entirely in the cold war context. The Soviet program is considerably more narrow in scope than that of the United States and is generally directed to places

⁵⁷Six types of foreign aid are described by Hans J. Morgenthau in his article "Preface to a Political Theory of Aid," which has been reprinted in several anthologies. His six types are humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development. These aid types are still the best short description of purposes for which aid can be used, and all can be considered as applicable within the cold war context.

⁵⁸Hollis B. Chenery, "Objectives and Criteria for Foreign Assistance," Why Foreign Aid? R. A. Goldwin ed., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 33.

⁵⁹Howard K. Smith et. al., The Ruble War, subtitled "A Study of Russia's Economic Penetration versus U. S. Foreign Aid. (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes & Marshall, 1958).

where political results can be expected.

The effect of economic assistance as a weapon in the cold war is dependent upon the amount of political leverage that it can gain for the giver in a recipient country. Even access for one's propaganda material to the communications media of the recipient country can lead to increased good will toward the donor nation and decreasing friendship with the cold war opponent. Aid can also give a firm ally the strength to maintain political stability, and its threatened withdrawal can possibly discourage unfriendly actions by the recipient nation.

In practice, the use of aid as a cold war weapon has been disillusioning for both sides. Because of its availability from the cold war opponent, aid has not resulted in the development of strong allies unless there were present other conditions more important than aid in the determination of cold war side-taking. Many neutral nations have begun to play one cold war opponent against the other, drawing aid from both and giving political benefit to neither. Aid has been successful in such cases when the interests of the giver and recipient have been in accord, such as the bringing into the neutralist grouping nations that would otherwise be more influenced by the cold war opponent. Examples here include

Yugoslavia for the United States and Egypt for the Soviet Union.

5. THE ROLES OF DIPLOMACY

The extensive use of political warfare in the cold war system of conflict has resulted in the development of a new role for diplomacy in addition to its traditional place in international affairs. The new role is a public one, and it has grown out of both the Wilsonian and the Trotskyite distaste for secret agreements. The occasional resort to public threats, the "missile rattling" and "nuclear blackmail" are only a small part of this role; and its most frequent employment is in the arena of public negotiation about subjects that really have very little chance of resolution.

The new role of diplomacy consists primarily in the conduct of negotiation for "side-effects" rather than for the purpose of reaching agreement. Side-effects of negotiation have been defined as effects, not concerning agreement, which flow from the very process of negotiation.⁶⁰ Fred Charles Ikle notes that "proposals and speeches at the conference table,

⁶⁰ Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper & Row, 1964, p. 42. Here the author studies the negotiating process within the theoretical framework laid down in Thomas C. Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, cited earlier in this paper.

contacts with the opponent's diplomats, and the interest aroused among third parties may all contribute to various policy aims without leading to the settlement of the issues openly discussed."⁶¹ He lists as among the most important side-effects of negotiation those of maintaining contact, substituting for violent action, gaining intelligence, deception, propaganda, and the impact of negotiation on third parties. In the cold war system the most important of the side-effects is that of propaganda, including the impact of the negotiation on third parties.

Professor Ikle writes that propaganda can be either a technique for getting good terms of agreement or a side-effect which serves other foreign policy objectives. The latter use of propaganda he examines in three aspects: "negotiating to have a sounding-board, negotiating to gain prestige, and negotiating to show rectitude like the Pharisee saying his prayers."⁶² The sounding-board effect of negotiation occurs mainly at summit meetings and other high-level conferences; and it serves to give a government's positions and policy goals more publicity than they might otherwise receive, especially when they are put forth as negotiating proposals. Proposals made

⁶¹Ikle, op. cit., p. 42. ⁶²Ibid., p. 52.

in the glare of such publicity can be done with little regard for their acceptance by one's opponent, and attention can be directed instead to their effect upon the people of the opposing nation or upon world opinion.

Negotiating for prestige is of value to those governments who feel that their name and political standing are enhanced by attendance at such international meetings, much the same as the prestige of a national leader is enhanced through state visits to or from the leaders of important nations. This cannot be ruled out of the frequent Russian demands for summit meetings during the 1950's, but neither can it be considered as of more than minor importance.

The practice of negotiating to show rectitude and to place one's opponent in an unfavorable position in regard to world opinion comes from the prevalent notion that negotiation is a "good thing" and that the mere act of negotiating and the presentation of proposals can gain favor in the eyes of the world. Both cold war opponents have made and explained the rightness, and therefore the uncompromisability, of their proposals for the reunification of Germany, but each proposal contained a first step that was unacceptable to the opponent. Negotiating to show rectitude has become quite common in the Geneva disarmament negotiations, which one writer describes as

an "international farce" and accuses the negotiators of both sides of "playing the game of political warfare, busily putting each other in the wrong before the bar of world opinion."⁶³

John Spanier breaks down the elements of gamesmanship used by both sides in the Geneva negotiations. He lists them as: first, the carrying on of negotiations amid a continual barrage of propaganda; second, the oversimplification of issues to increase their appeal to world opinion; third, the drawing out of negotiations by presentation of proposals that had previously been rejected; and fourth, and most important, the posing by each side as the representative of virtue and the picturing of the opponent as the offspring of the devil. He considers the object of this Soviet-American gamesmanship to be "to reject the proposals of the other side without appearing to sabotage the negotiations, to portray one's own plans as reasonable and realistic and those of one's opponent as unworkable and unfair, and to place the blame for the failure of the negotiations on the other side." This is done through the introduction of the "joker," the one condition in every disarmament proposal that makes it unacceptable to the opponent.

⁶³John Strachey, On the Prevention of War, London: Macmillan, 1962, p. 162.

This joker can be a condition inserted into the proposal for the purpose of making it unacceptable, or it can be a provision included because it is considered to be necessary to the security of the nation making the proposal. Either way, its effect is the same.⁶⁴

An outstanding example of the new role of diplomacy was that grandest of recent international conferences, the Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955. The event was hailed with great enthusiasm by world opinion and by several of the non-participating world leaders, and a record thirteen hundred representatives of the world press applied for press cards. Both sides came to the conference with the misconception that the other was ready to make major concessions, and the optimistic mood was furthered by the friendly behavior of the Soviet delegation during the pre-conference festivities.⁶⁵

The differing programs put forth by the heads of the delegations were viewed as only the first stage of bargaining.

⁶⁴John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament, New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 48-54. The use of the joker is in no way confined to proposals concerning disarmament, and its use has already been mentioned above in the conflicting conditions presented by Russia and the United States for the formation of an all-German government.

⁶⁵David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p.281.

President Eisenhower spoke of three issues: Germany, Eastern Europe, and international communism; but all except Germany were shortly afterward vetoed as agenda items by Bulganin. Three issues proposed by Russia--cessation of the cold war, neutrality, and Asia and the Far East--were likewise rejected. This left Germany as the sole subject for serious discussion; and when, after three days, neither side had budged from its original position, the conference closed and the problems were turned over to a conference of foreign ministers to be held soon afterwards.

Although the only agreement reached at Geneva was a tacit one of acceptance of the status quo in Germany in the face of continued disagreement as to its resolution, the side-effects of the conference had an importance of their own. By their acceptance at the conference, the Russians were accorded a status of equality by the Western powers. The great amount of publicity given the conference enabled the Soviets, who frequently had met resistance to their attempts to spread their propaganda through the non-communist news media, to speak over the heads of the other delegations and directly to the people of the world. For some time afterward the Russian press treated the conference as though it had been successful, and the "spirit of Geneva" continued to be mentioned by Moscow

even after the failure of the conference of foreign ministers in November.⁶⁶ The largest apparent success for the American side came in the Eisenhower "open skies" proposal, which is reported as being made primarily for its propaganda value toward combatting the rising European indifference to NATO and unenthusiasm for American bases on European soil.⁶⁷

While one aspect of cold war diplomacy was that of a technique of political warfare, the normal diplomatic contact maintained at all times between the United States and the Soviet Union can be best considered within the historic definition of diplomacy rather than as part of the cold war system. The traditional methods of secret diplomacy and private negotiation were the ones chosen whenever there arose issues upon which agreement was of interest to both sides. Already mentioned in this paper were the negotiations conducted by Soviet UN Delegate Jacob Malik that led to the termination of the blockade of Berlin and the cease-fire in Korea. The relative effectiveness of public and private negotiations was graphically illustrated by the rapidity with which the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in private, after years

⁶⁶Dallin, op. cit., p. 285.

⁶⁷Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956, pp. 344-6.

of public effort without agreement in Geneva.

It is worthy of note that the private diplomatic contact between the United States and the Soviet Union has not resulted in any steps to end the cold war or to resolve any of the concrete issues over which the cold war originally came to be. Rather, the diplomatic efforts of both powers have been directed toward keeping the conflict between them within the confines of the cold war system; and ever since the start of the cold war constant contact has been maintained between the two nations to try to prevent misunderstandings that could cause intensification of the conflict and lead to the possibility of its getting out of control. Frequent examples of diplomatic efforts to keep the cold war controllable and within its system are available; and recent ones include the Test Ban Treaty, the pronouncements of the destructiveness of nuclear war by both President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, and the establishment of a line of direct communication between Washington and Moscow. All of these steps have taken place since the advent of the balance of nuclear terror situation and after the specific time period under discussion in this paper; and all of them are efforts, not to resolve the cold war conflict, but merely to keep it on a level on which it can be controlled.

CHAPTER V

SUEZ: THE MATURE SYSTEM

With the introduction of foreign assistance programs on a large scale by both sides, the cold war system of conflict as it is known today was brought to its full development, and even as it was reaching this full development the bipolar world that fostered it was beginning to come apart. The first cracks became visible in the great power maneuvering following the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, while at the same time splits were appearing in the Russian empire in Eastern Europe.

The actions of the United States and Russia in the Suez Canal crisis of the fall of 1956 demonstrated the maturity of the cold war system of conflict, but as a result of this crisis a new element was added to the relationship between the two powers. The maturity of the system was shown by the use, at one time or another, and in accord with the rules of conduct established over the previous years, of all the applicable cold war techniques which are in use at the present day. Economic and military assistance, propaganda, diplomatic maneuvering and threats, attempts at a form of

intervention that would have to be accepted by the opponent, and small-scale warfare were all used by at least one of the several participants. The new element was that of the United States and Russia being united in opposition to the desires of Great Britain and France, the first time during the period of cold war that the two great powers were on the same side in any major international issue. From this time on, the possibility of Russian and American cooperation toward a common goal, whether for the same or for differing reasons, was one that would have to be considered; and each of the two nations would be forced to abandon the position of automatic opposition to anything the other had done simply for the reason that the other had done it.

The Suez incident had been building since the overthrow of King Farouk of Egypt in 1952 and particularly since Gamal Abdel Nasser's official assumption of power in 1954. Since the early part of 1955, trade and diplomatic relations had been increasing between Egypt and the nations of the Soviet bloc; and Russian arms and technicians had been brought into Egypt in increasing numbers.¹ Nasser was not the first leader

¹By the end of October 1956, the number of Russian and East European diplomats and technicians in Egypt was estimated to be as high as two thousand. New York Times, October 29, 1956.

of a small nation to make the cold war work to his advantage, but he was the first to try to play the great powers against one another to do so. Assistance from the Soviet Union did not pull Nasser into the Soviet bloc, whether or not that was its purpose; but it did enable him to act in what he considered his own interest and also the Russian interest without fear of Western economic reprisals.

The financing of the Aswan High Dam had originally been offered in part by the United States; but in July 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew the American offer. Dulles' ostensible reason for this action was some financial difficulty concerning Egyptian ability to pay its share for the construction of the dam; his actual reason has been described as that of Egypt's policy stands contrary to those of the United States.² W. W. Rostow called the withdrawal of the offer of assistance on the dam "a virtual challenge to Nasser, in effect ending the awkward interval of two-way Egyptian blackmail and inviting Nasser to do his worst."³

²Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis (Hammondsmith, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1957), pp. 57-9. Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Evanston: Row, Peterson, & Company, 1960), pp. 274-5.

³W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 357.

Nasser's worst was the nationalization of the Suez Canal, a step that hurt Great Britain and France more than anyone else. Both of these nations had, since the end of the Second World War, lost most of their prior influence in the Arab world; and they had little more to lose through any ill-will that would be created by their taking over the canal by force of arms and thereby possibly unseating Nasser. Still they acted with caution. Their attack on the canal did not take place until diplomatic efforts had failed three months after nationalization, and then it was done in concert with a move by Israel through the Gaza strip.

The United States and Russia each had an interest in the prevention of hostilities in the Suez area. Both were concerned about the controllability of any war that might break out in the Middle East. The Russian objective in Egypt had been the replacement of Western influence in the country with her own,⁴ and she had been proceeding toward it quite well through propaganda and the use of economic and military assistance. The United States wanted to preserve her influence in the area in the face of Russian expansion. She saw communism as the real enemy in the Middle East and regarded Arab

⁴Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 107.

nationalism as a potential ally against it. The American policy makers, therefore, "were by no means disposed to encourage communism by conniving at an attack on Egypt which they regarded as being inspired by predatory Anglo-French imperial interests."⁵

During the period of time between the nationalization of the canal and the British and French paratroop attack, Russian propaganda, in its normal cold war way, continued to equate the interests of the three major Western powers with one another. This was done on doctrinal as well as practical grounds, in accord with the "primary Soviet principle" of opposition to the United States,⁶ as well as for the practical objective of bringing about the total discrediting of the West in Arab eyes.⁷ Whether or not the Soviets believed their own propaganda, their continued promulgation of the position of Western solidarity left Russia unprepared when the United States took the lead in opposition to Great Britain and France.

As early as the Second London Conference in September 1956, differences were observable among the Western allies in

⁵John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 142.

⁶David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Co., 1961), pp. 412-20.

⁷Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 93.

their desires concerning the proposed Suez Canal Users' Association, and their differences were expressed by Dulles at his news conference on October 2. A momentary appearance of harmony was shown at the United Nations on October 13, when Dulles voted in favor of the Anglo-French Security Council resolution designed to implement the principles upon which the Users' Association was to be based; but Dulles voted as he did for political reasons of his own rather than from any necessary convergence of his interests with those of Great Britain and France.⁸ Shortly after the Russian veto of this resolution came increasing coolness between the United States and Great Britain and France and the trip of Anthony Eden and Selwyn Lloyd to Paris. Russia, having doubts about the results of the Paris meeting between the British and French prime ministers and soon to be occupied with her own problems in Hungary, shortly afterward reduced her polemics over the Suez developments and remained relatively inactive regarding the Middle East question until after the outbreak of hostilities

⁸Dulles had promised to support the Anglo-French resolution in return for British agreement to his suggestion that the meetings of the Security Council be held in closed session, in which the Anglo-French, the Egyptian, and the Russian propagandists would be unable to mount their appeals to world opinion. Mint and Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis, p. 77. Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 297.

on October 29.

Upon the commencement of hostilities, the United States acted at once to try to restore order. The UN Security Council met on October 30 to consider an American resolution calling for Israel to give up the territory gained from Egypt and for everyone else to refrain from using force. The resolution was supported by Russia but vetoed by Great Britain and France. The Canadian cease-fire resolution in the General Assembly two days later was also supported by the United States and Russia and opposed by Great Britain and France.

The cold war issue at stake in the Suez Canal incident was the desire, held by Russia and the United States, to each increase her influence in the Arab world at the expense of the other. To this end, the American efforts were directed toward getting the British and French out of the Canal Zone; and American pressure has been credited by some observers as the decisive factor in bringing about the withdrawal.⁹ Early Russian attempts to lead the opposition to the Anglo-French action took the form of unsuccessful efforts to mobilize the Bandung powers and to hold another Afro-Asian conference on

⁹Marlowe, op. cit., p. 141. French Foreign Minister Pineau is reported to have rated American pressure as second only in importance to British internal division among the factors causing the Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez. Dallin, op. cit., p. 418.

the issue of Egypt.¹⁰ Later Russia tried, through threats aimed at Great Britain and France but made after the Anglo-French announcement of intent to withdraw from Egypt, to pose as the defender of the Arabs. A Russian proposal of Soviet-American collaboration to "guarantee the end of aggression against the Egyptian people" was rejected by the United States, and the rejection was accompanied by suggestions that the Soviets get out of Hungary.¹¹ After the announcement of the cease-fire, Russia offered to send volunteers to Egypt in case Great Britain and France refused to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory, but the timing of this offer indicates that it was made only after it was virtually certain that its implementation would not be required.¹²

When the Suez crisis of 1956 is looked upon as a cold war confrontation between the United States and Russia, the action pattern described above gives indications that the maneuvers of each great power were designed primarily for their effect upon the cold war opponent and only secondarily for their effect upon Egypt, Great Britain, and France. The United States wanted to restore order quickly, for any

¹⁰Dallin, p. 415. ¹¹Ibid., p. 417.

¹²Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 239.

lengthening of the period of instability would only give increased opportunity for Russian intervention through the sending of more technicians and canal pilots, to say nothing of the threatened "volunteers." Russia was less interested in preventing injury to Egypt than she was in the recruitment of other nations that she could lead in loud opposition to the Anglo-French action. The Egyptian act of nationalization, done in reprisal against an action of the United States and Great Britain, was something more easily supported by Russia than by the United States; and a judgment between conflicting interests was necessary before America could plunge into the fray.

That the Suez incident was indicisive in altering the Soviet-American power balance in the Arab world was not due to the inability of the techniques used to get results, but rather due to the fact that the actions of the two powers served to counter one another. If either had remained uninvolved, the other could have made some real, though temporary advances. Russia continued the propaganda battle long after the Suez incident itself had been ended; and the continued and unopposed effort, along with inept presentation by the United States, enabled the Soviets to bring about a rejection by Arab public opinion of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹³

¹³Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 241-4.

The real winner at Suez, however, was Nasser, who by the end of 1956 had increased his prestige and influence throughout the Arab world and had the two leading world powers vying for his friendship. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was able to dominate the Middle East, and each could act there only in accord with the interests of local powers. Arab nationalism remained the dominant force in the region.

The Suez crisis brought a rounding out of the techniques of the cold war. Since then there have been minor modifications of techniques seen earlier, such as the prestige competition in space; but here have been no new techniques introduced. Suez also showed the limits of applicability of the cold war. It was a case where the cold war was used for the benefit of a third party more than either participant and a case where common interest of the competing powers almost dictated open cooperation between them. For the United States and Russia the Suez incident was a demonstration that their quarrel could be turned to the benefit of others and that there should, in the future, be instances in which it would be to their benefit to act in common, each wanting the same end although for possibly different reasons.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM

The incidents of the cold war that have been discussed in the course of this paper have been covered from a very narrow viewpoint and with no attempt to analyze their significance on world affairs as a whole. The discussion has been concerned entirely with a demonstration of the contribution of these events to the development of the system of conflict that shows its full maturity at Suez in 1956. The cold war events since Suez have generally been conducted within the rules that had by then been established; and only one incident, with its implications for the system, has to be considered in any detail in order to bring the system up to date. Before that is done, it will be of value to analyze the system as it existed at the end of 1956, to break down the rules under which it operated, and to consider it as a conceptual whole rather than as a series of loosely connected events.

By the time of the Suez crisis, the objectives of the cold war had been clearly stated by each of the two competing nations; the rules of conduct had been established, and there was a method of determining who was winning. Both sides had

shown a willingness to express their conflict in the manner in which it was being done, and this willingness demonstrated before 1956 was to become even more apparent during the ensuing years of the nuclear balance of terror. There was still no guarantee that the cold war would stay cold, and there is none even today; but the public and official concern shown by both sides over a possible Soviet-American confrontation indicates that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to accept this system of conflict as an alternative to thermo-nuclear war for the settlement of all issues short of direct peril to their survival as great powers.

The basic expressed objectives of each side in the Soviet-American cold war have not changed since its inception, and they have not come any closer to being fulfilled. Since the Soviet Union developed the national power to start expanding territorially during the Second World War, she has preached of the collapse of an economic and social system called capitalism and of the dominance of Russian communism over the world. She has so far shown no verbal willingness to halt her struggle until her desired conditions are brought about. The United States still has as its announced objective "the granting of political freedom to Eastern Europe in exchange for a European armaments and security agreement, and

the creation of an effective international system of nuclear arms control."¹ The United States, since the inception of the cold war, has committed herself enough times to these objectives that she could renounce them only with great difficulty.

The objectives expressed above have in common the facts that neither concerns an interest vital to the continued existence of the nation espousing it, and that there is no serious pressure presented for an immediate solution of the problems raised by either objective. Each objective comes down finally to a question of abstract power, for power to bring about the acceptance of such an objective by an opponent would place the holder of that much power in a position so strong that he could force his opponent to accept almost anything else too. Unexpressed objectives of Russia and the United States, including some which are even capable of political or military realization, can all be considered as included in the larger expressed objective, and the resolution of a minor individual issue does nothing to reduce the abstract objective remaining.

Neither expressed objective is immediately realizeable by military means. A Russian military victory could not bring about the acceptance of communism by anyone, but it would only

¹W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 422.

result in a military occupation until such time as Russia would be no longer interested in seeing superficial compliance with a Soviet-imposed social system. An American military victory would eliminate the necessity for the European agreements sought by the United States, as there is no need for the vanquished to agree to actions taken by the victor. It is possible that the expressed cold war objectives may have been of high importance to the participants at one time, but their lack of attainability over the years has decreased what importance they may have had. Also tending to decrease their importance is the ease with which their unattainability can be accepted, provided no public admission is made of it.

The willingness to carry on their conflict within the cold war system has been signified by both the United States and Russia through the efforts of each to avoid a direct military confrontation between them. This has taken the form, in head-to-head situations such as the Berlin blockade and later the Cuban missile crisis, of never placing the opponent in a situation from which there is no way out but to fight. In indirect confrontations such as Iran in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, it has taken the form in which the great power first intervening in a legal manner will not be opposed later by the other. In Suez in 1956,

neither power was able to get into a position whereby he could openly intervene, by invitation of Hasser, under conditions that would have to be accepted by the other. At the same time, joint action by the United States and Russia prevented successful intervention by others.

1. THE RULES OF COLD WAR

Objectives of cold war. Historically, wars have been fought for almost every imaginable reason; but the basic and immediate objectives of warfare have always been the same. The basic objective of warfare is to make one's enemy do what one wants him to do, or to destroy his ability or his will to resist the carrying out of whatever designs one may have on him. In a parallel manner, the basic objective of cold war can be termed as that of demonstrating to one's enemy the futility of his resisting your designs on him by means other than ones of intolerable violence, and that in opposing your designs he is in a minority position to you and all those other nations who support your point of view.

The immediate objective of warfare has in the past been the destruction of the enemy's army; in more recent years there has been added to this the occupation and control of the territory of the enemy. In the cold war system this objective

has to be scaled down to a level commensurate with the weapons used. On this level the immediate objective of cold war is the spreading of one's influence over real estate and the inhabitants of that real estate, generally, but not necessarily, at the expense of one's enemy. This can be done by maneuvering to bring about the political, economic, and moral isolation of one's opponent, in part through a demonstration to the uncommitted or about-to-be committed world of the superiority of one's own national ideology and institutions to those of the opponent, as well as the superiority of one's national power. This must be done in such a manner as to avoid a direct military confrontation, and the resulting chance of total war, between oneself and one's opponent.

Modern technological developments have reduced the necessity for the above objectives of cold war to be capable of being gained by the means used. In the past, wars have generally resulted in the attainment of their basic and immediate objectives by one of the participating nations; and when neither was successful the war was considered a draw, a solution was negotiated, and all major participating states were assured of their continued survival. In the present age, it is generally considered that the most likely results of all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia would

be the attainment of the above objectives by neither of the participants but possibly by a third party who remained uninvolved during hostilities, and the mutual destruction rather than the survival of the major participants. From this alternative, the objectives of cold war do not have to be attainable; they just have to be as nearly attainable as they would be by other means, while being less costly to pursue.

Requirements to participate. The nature of cold war as it was developed before 1956 and refined since then places certain requirements upon those nations who would participate in it. The requirements concern the nation itself, the opponent, and the prize sought. They can be listed as follows:

1. A legitimate reason for conflict with one's opponent. This can be a conflict of interest, or prestige, or of ideology, all of which have been reasons for wars between nations in the past. The limits upon this reason for conflict to make it a reason for cold war are that it must not be of vital interest to the nation concerned for then more violent means would probably be resorted to immediately regardless of possible cost, or it must not be an issue easily resolved by compromise or mediation. Ideally it should be an issue whose resolution is not urgent but which is able to arouse the nationalistic sentiments of the people and keep them aroused over an

extended period of time.

2. A national ideology. The nature of cold war makes ideology a necessary element in it. Since the objective of cold war is the conversion of third parties to one's point of view and against the point of view of one's opponent, ideology provides a messianic impulse in a nation and a basis upon which to appeal to the world. National ideology can take many forms--communism, democracy, zionism, pan-Arabism--its only requirement is some kind of -ism or anti-ism to which people of third countries are more likely to emotionally or intellectually respond than they are to the national interest of a nation other than their own.

3. Enough national power that the cold war participant will be taken seriously by the opponent and the world that he is trying to convert to his point of view. This precludes the possibility of cold war between a large, powerful nation and one that is small and weak. This would be so because the small nation would be unlikely to have the capability of doing injury to the large one by cold war means, while the large one would have little incentive to refrain from military action.

4. A prize to be won. Some other nations of the world must not be so concerned with other things that they remain unaware or inattentive to the conflict in spite of all efforts

made to attract their notice. Cold war is basically a struggle for allies to assist in the massing of world opinion and economic and social pressure against one's opponent; therefore, there must be in the world some potential allies who are willing to be courted and capable of being won.

5. Bipolarity. While not absolutely necessary for cold war participation, a situation of at least temporary or partial bipolarity is of great value. By bipolarity here is meant a condition whereby a third nation is in such a position that it is forced to choose the friendship and support of one or the other of cold war opponents; it cannot afford to choose neither. This is best illustrated at the present day by the case of Russia and China, presently vying for the leadership of world communism. Communist parties throughout the world that are not in power, and frequently those that are in power, still need outside support; and this support must come from either Russia or China. These two nations are, therefore, able, if it is to their advantage, to force others to choose between them.

6. Reason to choose cold war over the alternatives of either hot war or negotiation for the resolution of conflict. Participation in cold war could take place for either positive or negative reasons, or both. The negative reason, the most

simple, is the desire to avoid the mutual destruction of nuclear war, and this desire must be greater than any urgency to resolve the issues of conflict. Reasons for choosing cold war over negotiation could be the hope of improving a negotiating position through the use of cold war methods, -a lack of desire to resolve the issue at question or a knowledge that any possible solution acceptable to one side would be unacceptable to the other, or the desire for the maintenance of a wartime atmosphere for its contribution to the development of internal consensus or the holding close of reluctant allies.

The rules of conduct. By 1956 the rules for the conduct of the cold war had developed into a pattern of sorts. This pattern was not rigid, and it was not officially accepted by either of the competing powers. It was entirely a result of tacit agreements between the United States and Russia, and it included areas such as the limiting of war in which even tacit agreement was lacking. Each time a nation acted in accord with the established pattern, that nation did so because to do so was in the national interest at that particular time and place with consideration given to the materials available; and there was no apparent concern given to the development of a system of conflict. Yet the pattern did exist, and every action accepted by the cold war opponent contained within

itself the likelihood of its repetition by either side. Once the precedent was established, action within the pattern tended to become safer and easier, especially so as the possibility of winning the cold war became more and more remote.

By 1956 the pattern of cold war conduct included attempts to win allies to one's side and to isolate one's opponent by any means short of direct military activity. Subversion, espionage, and other covert means of projection of power were becoming accepted by both sides, with the understanding that these attempts could be quelled by the government concerned by any means available to it and with the support, but not the direct intervention unless by invitation, of the cold war opponent. Any internal disturbance which had been brought about by cold war maneuvering in a country would be handled as an internal matter, with or without great power support, and retaliation would not be carried across the borders of the country concerned. There was given practical acceptance by this time to the freedom of action of either great power, without organized interference by the other, in the territory under its direct control, and to the informal designation of the vast area of the world controlled by neither as the area of battle. There was also the question of limited war between one great power and forces directly supported by

the other, but the implied rules for limitation of war cannot be said to be sufficiently developed, especially in areas of vital security interest to either the United States or to Russia, to contain adequate guidelines for the future.

Keeping in mind the tacit quality of the rules and precedents of cold war and the qualifying statements already made about them, it is possible to list the major guidelines of cold war conduct. They are as follows:

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF COLD WAR

- I. Thou shalt not become involved in a direct military confrontation with thine enemy.
- II. Thou shalt not meddle overtly in the affairs of thine enemy on his own territory, nor shalt thou send thy soldiers into places already occupied by the soldiers of thine enemy. (Soldiers of a satellite nation or other acceptable third party may be sent, if they are available and conditions favor sending them.)
- III. Thou shalt make all thy moves with caution, to convince thine enemy of thy (immediately) limited intent.
- IV. Thou shalt not press thine advantages to their fullest, lest thine enemy be forced into acts of desperation.
- V. Thou shalt make war on thine enemy only by means not directly traceable to thyself.

- VI. Thou shalt get someone else to do thy dirty work.
- VII. Thou shalt not confess to any action detrimental to the interests of thine enemy, even if thou art caught red-handed at it.
- VIII. Thou shalt remain in communication with thine enemy at all times.
- IX. If thou shouldst become involved in a direct military confrontation with thine enemy, thou shalt take immediate steps to lower the tensions regardless of the attainment of other objectives; and thou shalt expect thine enemy to do the same.
- X. Thou shalt accept as unalterable by military force any minor changes in the power balance brought about by enemy action within the limits of the above commandments.

Winning in cold war. No nation has ever won a cold war, so there is no basis in fact from which to extrapolate the position to be held by such a victor. When the objectives and the limits of the cold war system are considered, it is doubtful that a nation would be desirous of going so far as to win; at least the powers that have so far been involved in cold war have shown no eagerness to do so. While victory, however, may not be important in cold war, the process of winning certainly is; and the system does provide a method of keeping score and of telling which side is in the process of winning at

any particular moment.

Scorekeeping in the cold war is done initially by expressed world opinion; and later, in an extreme case, it could be determined by the tangible effects of the increasing or decreasing influence on the world scene of a competing power. Scorekeeping by world opinion is done through indication of preference by other nations for the institutions of one cold war opponent over those of the other, and by increasingly close ties between formerly uncommitted nations and one opponent at the expense of the other.

The process of winning in the Soviet-American cold war has come to be measured by the portion of the world and its people over which the influence of either of the competing powers is felt, and this can be roughly translated into the number and strength of either power's allies at any given time. Alliances with one of the cold war powers can be reflected through treaties or the granting of such privileges as military bases, but they are more often determined through such things as voting in the United Nations or even favorable treatment of a competing power in the press of a third country. Informal alliances reflected through UN voting or press treatment are usually unstable and highly vulnerable to changing circumstances, so the score of the United States or Russia in

cold war competition can change almost from day to day. Louis Fischer considered this when he said that there could be no cold war if all states now aligned with one or the other of the great powers were unalterably or hopelessly aligned and if all unaligned governments were unalterably neutral.²

Aside from territory gained as a determination of standing in a cold war, there seems to be some modification, either as a bonus or as a penalty, given by world opinion in recognition of the methods used to gain the territory. The Soviets have been considered to have "paid a dear price for the reconquest of Hungary in the loss of support they suffered from sympathetic states in the Western and non-Western worlds, in the loss of confidence from satellite regimes, and in the increased efforts they were henceforth required to make in order to maintain their satellite empire."³ At the very least, it is possible for a single incident to be productive of territorial gain for one side and a balancing propaganda victory for the other.

As an outgrowth of cold war scorekeeping, there arises a weakness in the system because of its requirement for nations

²Louis Fischer, Russia, America and the World (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 4.

³Charles C. Lorch, The Cold War...And After, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 104.

that can be enticed into indicating a preference between cold war opponents. A cold war cannot be carried on successfully between two nations unless someone else will pay attention to their struggle. Even more bothersome to competing nations is the ease with which cold war lends itself to being turned to the advantage of powers other than those directly involved in it. This has been particularly evident in the handling of economic warfare and foreign economic assistance. Neutral or non-committed nations today all too frequently take assistance from both cold war participants for their own purposes and do not give support to either except where the cold war participant is acting directly in accord with the interests of the neutral. Nasser of Egypt was the pioneer in this pattern of action; but he has since been joined by Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and others. The situation at the present day has reached the point where the United States and Russia, lacking the bipolarity still remaining in the Sino-Soviet conflict, are becoming quite disillusioned about the value of foreign economic assistance as a weapon against one another.

Ending cold war. Given the unlikelihood of any nation winning a cold war in absolute terms and the fact that no cold war started since 1945 has been brought to a conclusion, any judgment on the ending of a cold war will have to be based on

speculation. In the course of the Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet cold wars, each nation has made ideological commitments that it would find extremely difficult to break. It is quite possible that the interests of the competing nations, through the necessity to unite in the face of a common threat or the arising of business more important than the prosecution of that particular international quarrel, would incline them away from the active participation in cold war and into other pursuits. In this case it is most likely that the substantive issues over which a cold war is being waged would decline in relative importance, and the ideological issues would tend to gradually become ignored rather than renounced. In this way a cold war could be brought to an end without a victory for either side. There have been occasional signs of this happening in the Soviet-American cold war, but every time so far something has come up to return it to a more important position in the relations between the two states.

Overview. The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that there has been developing in the years since the end of the Second World War a new pattern of conflict tailored specifically to the age in which it has been taking place. The analysis describes a pattern of action, a record of the actions of two great powers over a space of almost ten years, which by

its completeness as a conceptual whole is capable of being viewed as a system of conflict distinct from nuclear war or limited war or any other system of conflict. The rules of cold war have been enforceable only inasmuch as they have been in accord with the interests of the competing powers, and action will cease to be in accord with them as soon as the action they prescribe becomes contrary to the interests of the states involved. One of the more remarkable things about the cold war system as a whole is its stability, the fact that it continues to be used even by nations other than those through whose actions it came to be, and in spite of its obvious shortcomings.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: APPLICABILITY FOR TODAY

The limits of the system. For some time after 1956 the cold war stayed comfortably within its limits. The Mid-East interventions of 1958 were respected by Russia. Khrushchev's withdrawal of his ultimatum on Berlin in 1959 avoided a major confrontation, and the American failure to admit open involvement in the Bay of Pigs episode did the same thing. The Berlin wall demonstrated the Soviet freedom of action within their own territory and the acceptance by the United States of Soviet dominance behind the iron curtain. The war in Viet Nam was not escalated, partly because of the lack of guidelines in the system for the escalation into limited or unlimited war. Then came the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In the Cuban missile affair, the Russians did not exceed the bounds of the cold war system by having missiles in Cuba; their military value was minor compared to the nuclear striking power possessed by either great power. Where they exceeded the limits of the system was in flaunting these missiles in the face of the United States after their initial discovery had been made and thereby turning an annoying Russian

satellite of limited value into a direct affront to American security and, more directly, to American prestige as a great power.

Before the speech by President Kennedy, the United States made war preparations sufficient to convince Russia that she was willing to fight if necessary to have this threat to her well-being removed from Cuba. Any action on the part of the United States would be directed entirely against the missiles in Cuba, but because of Russia's inability to defend this area by any limited means the fighting could not stop in Cuba without a serious prestige loss to the Soviet Union. At the same time, President Kennedy's political demands upon Russia were moderate. She would be required only to remove the offensive weapons from Cuba, and there would be no on-site inspection to ensure that all the weapons were taken away. The demands left the implication that some missiles could be left behind, so long as a reasonable number were removed and any left behind were not situated so as to be visible to American reconnaissance aircraft. Once these requirements had been met, Russia was effectively prohibited from making any cold war capital from whatever missiles, if any, she had remaining in Cuba.

The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that there can

arise situations of national status or security which are beyond the capacity of the cold war system to handle. These situations must be avoided when possible. Once involved in such a situation, one power has to retreat; but that retreat must be made as painless as possible by the other. Here the common interest of both powers in the avoidance of an intolerable level of violence must override whatever national power interest each is pursuing. The common interest in the avoidance of nuclear hostilities in the Cuban missile crisis was effective in bringing the cold war opponents to cooperate to reduce the level of international tension; no one is eager to again push this common interest to the extent it was pushed then.

Evaluation of the system. Like any other systematic pattern of action, the cold war system of conflict has its strengths and its weaknesses. The first strength of the cold war system is that it does provide a channel for the expression of conflict between nations. In the past this was not so important; but in the present day, to use the words of Charles O. Lerche, the provision of a channel by which nations can "conduct conflict that is tense, permanent, and wide-ranging in an era of total ideologies and hydrogen bombs without blowing everyone to bits is a major accomplishment."¹

¹Charles O. Lerche, The Cold War...And After (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 34.

As well as providing a means for conflict expression, the cold war system has the capability of bringing about the resolution of minor issues between nations. Toward this end its techniques may be a way of mobilizing world opinion to encourage settlement of an issue by arbitration or other non-violent means more favorable to one side than the other. For larger issues, it could theoretically make the influence of one competing power sufficiently greater than his opponent; that the issue at stake would be thereby reduced in importance, if not resolved.

Already mentioned has been the value of cold war to the government of a competing power for its effect on the internal political conditions of a nation. It allows a government to exercise wartime powers without facing wartime dangers. It permits expression of the dissatisfaction of a nation with the conduct of another state through a method easier than that of war, and it can assist in the maintenance of an internal consensus in support of the government in power. A cold war in progress can be of value also in the maintenance of alliances which give economic or other benefit but which would tend to disintegrate in the absence of an external threat.

The principal weaknesses of cold war as a system of conflict would appear to be its expensiveness, its indecisiveness,

the dangers involved in its conduct, and its susceptibility to use by others. Cold war in all its ramifications, from prestige competition in space to the maintenance of large establishments for foreign propaganda and economic assistance, is a costly business; and it draws upon funds that could be put to more productive use in other fields. While the cold war may be theoretically capable of resolving issues, the experience of the Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet conflicts has shown that little can be expected to be resolved by cold war means. There is danger involved in the prosecution of cold war, for although the possibility of inadvertant hot war can be kept small, it cannot be entirely eliminated. Finally, there is the frustrating experience of watching a neutral accept assistance without giving acceptable political behavior in return or being able, through the threat of giving support to the cold war opponent, to force a great power to act contrary to its own interests in support of the neutral.

The deciding factor in favor of the continued existence of cold war as a system of conflict is a comparison between it and its alternative as a system of conflict for this age. The cold war is not inexpensive, but it is less expensive even than the conventional wars of the past. It is indecisive, but so have been other wars fought for intangible objectives; and

the best prospect available to even an exhausted victor of a future nuclear exchange would be to be ripe for domination by a power that had not participated in the exchange. The intensity of cold war has to be controlled at least at the upper limit, but in the age of the balance of nuclear terror it is in the interest of the survival of all states to exercise this control. The system does allow the possibility of making limited gains while conducting and articulating a great-power conflict through relatively non-destructive means; and this small capability, set against its alternative, gives the system its value at the present day.

Applicability for today. At the present time there are two cold wars being waged in the world. Each has been in existence for some years and shows no signs of soon coming to an end. Simultaneously, there are several other international disagreements, those between the United States and France, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Israel and the Arab world, whose expression involves some of the techniques of cold war but fail to meet some of the requirements of the system. In the contemporary world the cold war system of conflict has been providing a relief valve for the expression of great-power conflict, and the experience of the participating nations has demonstrated their ability to draw some satisfaction from it.

The cold war system has served as a vehicle of expression of conflicting interests of the participating nations, as well as for the airing of uncompromisable ideological differences that are not amenable to resolution by any means and whose resolution is not really required in the normal relations between states. Until there is found a better method of airing and expressing conflict or until ideology declines in importance in the makeup of national states, it can be expected that the cold war system will continue to serve its present function in international affairs.

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